Alright, since I have been tweeting mostly about the role of existing European and American sanctions, I feel I should offer some clarity regarding the Caesar Act, which went into force yesterday with the designation of three loyalist businessmen and their respective firms. /1

Caesar has divided even the Syrian opposition. Where past sanctions have mostly sought to limit the Syrian regime's ability to access Western resources for their butchery, Caesar effectively mandates the US employ its economic power deter third parties from engaging Damascus. /2

As a result, most larger companies around the world are likely to refuse any transactions involving the Syrian government (or its banks), effectively cutting off its last remaining sources of foreign currency and crippling any prospect of outside investment for reconstruction. /3

There may exceptions, see for example the few countries still willing to engage in trade with sanctioned Iran. But Syria is unlikely to be rebuilt with Russian, Iranian or Chinese capital. Its investors sit in Europe, the Gulf and neighbouring Lebanon - who will likely comply. /4

Such extraterritorial sanctions are not unprecedented, though Syria is especially vulnerable to external shocks: After 9 years of war, what little remains of the Syrian economy is on the brink of collapse. It was "Bashar or we burn the country" - and burn the country they did. /5

As a consequence, given Assad all-but-won the war, the most likely outcome of prolonged, comprehensive and effective enforcement of the Caesar Act (which is what the administration is aiming to do) is the extended immiseration of millions of Syrians in areas under its control. /6

I do not have space to fully disentangle channels of impact and scenarios for reconstruction. But the numbers show: The principal cause of Syria's economic destitution and the principal obstacle to its post-war recovery is the *systemic violence* inflicted by the Assad regime. /7

This is not just about blame-shifting. The merits of the Caesar Act turn on judgements about the relationship between moral and political responsibility and economic cost. Its provisions connect economic activity and effectively diplomatic normalization with accountability. /8

Critical takes often times summarize the demands of the Caesar Act as "regime-change" - attempt to achieve via economic pressure what Washington had apparently failed to accomplish on the battlefield. This is also the narrative advanced by the Syrian and Russian governments. /9

This is crude. The US and Europe long abandoned any pretense of seeking the violent overthrow of Assad. In fact, the policy consensus has been in favour of state preservation since about 2013. Western sanctions are thus tied to advances in the UN-sponsored political process. /10

Meaning until now, sanctions served to incentivize Assad's participation in activities like the Constitutional Committee - a Russian, not an American initiative. In terms of state preservation, Caesar sets the bar *even lower* - with the exception of one crucial exception. /11

The Caesar Act requires the president determine seven conditions be met for sanctions relief: (1&4) No more indiscriminate bombardment of civilian populations, hospitals, schools; (2) access of humanitarian aid to besieged populations; (3) release of political prisoners; ... /12

... (5) compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention; (6) safe, dignified and voluntary return of displaced civilians; and finally and crucially (7) "[Syria] take verifiable steps to establish meaningful accountability for perpetrators of war crimes". /13

Conditions 1 thru 6 only demand a halt to what the UN as termed a campaign of "extermination" by the Assad regime against the Syrian population. However unlikely it would be to comply, there is no existential threat to the Syrian regime in these, given the current reality. /14

It is condition seven, the establishment of justice for victims and the pursuit of truth and reconciliation that is de-facto unobtainable, considering every single member of the Syrian leadership is directly implicated in the most horrific mass crimes of the 21st century. /15

Imagine asking the Nazi party to establish the Nuremberg trials. The provision presupposes regime change. And yet, this is why a lot of Western commentators have remained mum on this: who gets to detach the provisions 1-6, expressions of universal foundational values, from 7? /16

Almost all who work on this file have listened to victims recount terrible, irredeemable horrors. The defector for whom the act is named, Caesar, smuggled photos of tens of thousands of emaciated corpses out of the country. The sort of thing we question our grandparents over. /17

And who has not been shamed by our collective failure to intervene, to lift even a finger to end this horror? And justice and reconciliation are not optional. Violence against people and the destruction of the Syrian social fabric account for 95% of GDP loss during the war. /18

As for my own judgement. Last year I put it like this: I am repulsed by the gap between the late moral ambition of the Caesar Act and our real policy in Syria which for nine long years has, at every turn, refused to actively enforce the principles underpinning provisions 1-6. /19

Now, not to duck the question. In a straight vote, if it came before me, abandoning analytical equivocation, I would probably not assent to it - at least not with provision seven as is. The reality is too stark and my reservoir of hope for positive policy change exhausted. /21

Bashar Al-Assad and his regime sized us up and bet the lives and livelihoods of twenty million Syrians on the notion that, in the end, when faced with chaos in the Middle East, all our haughty slogans of "never again" will once again be proven the hollow talk that they are. /20

I would thus begrudgingly abstain on the first and last meaningful policy measure conceived in Washington premised, even notionally, on civilian protection and accountability. This judgement is less an expression of foreign policy realism but an admission of profound failure. /21

In the end, I wished I could argue my case on procedural grounds, for example against the premise of extraterritorial sanctions, but that's certainly not a line of reasoning we would accept in any other historical circumstance (and even morally far lighter ones, like Iran). /22

It leaves a bitter aftertaste. In the end, we all bought into Assad's bargain. I think it eventually returns us the worst kind of foreign policy bifurcation, where our only two options when faced with a ruthless murderous tyranny are violent overthrow or quasi normalization. /23

I see my first tweet misleadingly promised clarity. My public finance prof used to say we could pass any exams if we opened with "well, it's a trade-off!" - policy choices express our conception of the good. Finally, I honestly dont know what if any good we're left to uphold. /24

Syrians themselves certainly struggle to see the light at the end of the tunnel. True or not, a recent non-public survey showed a great majority of Syrians blamed Caesar sanctions for the ongoing collapse of the Syrian currency. A smaller majority thought the Assad regime ... /25

... was terrified at the measures, had no means of responding to them and in their wake, would face instability across the country. There is a real chance of famine later this year, one the Syrian regime, which imports tanks rather than wheat, would surely blame on sanctions. /26

There are of course those few who relish such prospects. They share more premises with the twisted world view that kept the Assad regime, which murdered half a million people rather than take a plane and a billion dollars to Belarus, in power than they do with its opponents. /27

And with that, I'll turn to dinner. /28