[Thread] Many argue the current China crisis will push India closer to the US. I have a new journal article, as part of a special issue on US ally/partner perceptions of the US and international order, that studies the broader arc of US-India relations. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2020.1777040

The project, funded by @SPF_PR & led by @ryo384_ir & Evelyn Goh, brought academics from US allies/partners together in a series of workshops. There were no Americans in the room. As you can imagine, the conversation was different in interesting ways.

The special issue contains articles on Germany, Turkey, Poland, Japan, Australia, and India. My article on India, is titled "Chaos as opportunity: the United States and world
order in India’s grand strategy." In it, I make the following arguments.

1. While other allies/partners of the US worry about US power and commitment under Pres Trump, India has taken this opportunity to pursue its ambition of becoming a leading power in the int order. The US has in turn gone relatively easy on India re:sanctions, tariffs, etc.

2. From a macro-historical perspective, US-India relations have never been better. Starting with the Talbott-Singh talks following the 1998 nuclear tests, down to the logistical agreements in the process of being completed, relations have come an incredibly long way.

3. The US is important to India's grand strategy, at three levels: economic development (trade and FDI), regional security (Pakistan and China), and international status (top-rank membership of key int regimes, incl nuclear, UN, G-20, expanded G-7, etc.).

4. India is important to US grand strategy: Iran, China, Indo-Pacific, defense sales, counterterrorism, FDI. Yet, cooperation with India is challenging, & not at the level of other close partners and allies. The relationship's cost-benefit tends to work better for India.

Not a comprehensive list by any means, but indicative.

5. Why is it challenging? Partly for mundane bureaucratic reasons, but vitally because India still values strategic autonomy. All states do, but typically as what Isaiah Berlin would call negative liberty, i.e. freedom from excessive interference.

Major (rising) powers such as India and China value strategic autonomy as positive liberty, the freedom to pursue certain goals and projects at the global level. One of the most vital long-term international goals for India is to attain the status of a great power.

Given this goal, and that US alliances are typically asymmetric in power and authority, India is unlikely to accept an alliance with the US, unless it is on equal terms (not clear if US itself can or would agree). This is not a bad outcome, just one both sides must accept.

In fact, India is most comfortable with US power when it is used to bolster India's hard power (economic and military) and add diplomatic heft re:Pakistan and China. This kind of partnership does not trigger domestic politics over the potential loss of autonomy.

6. Trump has been helpful here. He has called out Pakistan, challenged China, instigated alliance networking, & created sufficient spaces in the int order for India to insert itself into evolving leadership positions (e.g. climate). Economic ties are the big question mark still.

7. Indian leaders sensed the big-picture opportunity even before Trump. Global power transition meant an int order that India historically saw as exclusionary was now up for real contestation and reform. India thus committed to "shoulder greater global responsibilities."

8. The US is comfortable with this, welcoming India's role as independent actor & "leading global power." This acceptance, coupled with declining relative US power in the Indo-Pacific, has created the terms of a mutually beneficial partnership of equals that was so far elusive.

9. Written last year, the article concluded that the biggest downside risk in all of this for India is, unsurprisingly, China.

10. Bottom line: the world is a more uncertain and chaotic place as the US retreats from and dismantles the international order. India aims to fill some gaps and pick up some pieces, to its own benefit. This may well work, so long as India and the US can be productive partners.

I drew on the great work of @Kate_SdE @Mukherjee_Anit @splalwani @HeatherRByrne @ConstantinoX @sumithakutty @DrIanHall @d_jaishankar @nktpnd @tanvi_madan @Rudra_81 @MohanCRaja @m_thyagaraj @AmritaNarlikar @tvpaul1 @jppjagannath1 @seemasirohi @AbercrombieCara @srinathraghava3

If you'd like a copy of the article and do not have institutional or otherwise paid access to the journal, please DM me for a link. I have 50 free e-copies to give away. /END

Seems like the journal has made the article free to access. Available here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569775.2020.1777040