NK’s recent actions and stmts are worrisome. Many have rightly pointed out how Kim is trying to manufacture tension & so far doing it in a nonlethal, but dramatic way. They’ve also said how we’ve seen this kind of behavior from NK b4.

Let me explain what this says about Kim. 1/

Yes, we have seen this before. NK acts aggressively, turns on a charm offensive to defuse tension and mitigate punishment, pushes boundaries of international tolerance, and creates a new normal. 2/

But what I think is so interesting is this: as much as Kim wanted to create his own brand and optimistically pushed forward on both nukes and econ prosperity, and did things his way (mtg with POTUS, for ex), he is unwilling—or unable—to escape his history or his inheritance. 3/

The regime’s long reliance on fear & repression and Kim’s robust use of purges have probably created groupthink within his advisers. They see their privilege, power, and access to Kim as being tied to catering to his preferences (namely, toughness, rather than compromise). 4/

In this environment, there is little incentive for creativity, innovative problem solving, and yes, supporting fruitful negotiations.

But this is the structure that he inherited and maintained bc he has to, or risk emboldening an elite cadre of independent thinkers. 5/

I do think Kim Jong Un wants to do better than his father and grandfather, not just muddle through on the economy. 6/

Nevertheless, while he’s been bold on the military side, he’s more timid and unsure on the economic side, unable to issue little more than vague directives about the people having to work harder, longer, faster and pressing his officials to do a better job. 7/

He came into the job almost a decade ago saying that the NK ppl no longer had to “tighten their belt”.

But with sanctions and COVID, he recognizes that the econ is not in great shape. After Hanoi fell apart, he had already been messaging the country to prepare for hardship. 8/

In part to compensate for his lackluster performance on the economy, Kim is doing what he has to do: double down on ideology, reinforce his role and that of the Kim family bloodline as the only legit leaders of NK, and yes, conduct military actions and issue threats. 9/

So we shld expect more harsh rhetoric from Pyongyang and a whipping up of nationalism by highlighting the “hostile” forces outside, and potentially more military actions like the one we saw today, even as the economy continues to spiral downward and the NK people suffer.
10/

Kim, indeed, is more like his father than he might want to admit. 11/

More analysis of why Kim does what he does is in my book: https://bookshop.org/books/becoming-kim-jong-un-a-former-cia-officer-s-insights-into-north-korea-s-enigmatic-young-dictator/9781984819727 12/