Gonna live tweet this:



thread
On intros. The topic to be SM's Universally Preferable Behavior (UPB) and RR's critique thereof
RR introducing himself now. Stephen Woodford . @RationalityRule dedicated to debunking bad religious/philsophical arguments. Attention to UPB over past few years.
Steel manning now introducted -- basic idea here is that you present the best posssible interpretation of your opponent's argument. . @BenBurgis did this against . @StefanMolyneux in their debate several weeks ago
Molyneux looks to define terms, also seen in the Burgis debate. Didn't go to well for SM last time, since Burgis caught him equivocating despite defining terms.
RR steelmanning SM first. So far so good. No objection from SM.
"UPB fills 3 conditions: universal (independent of time and place); something they can prefer; and behavior"
RR snuck "self-detonating behavior" into his steel manning, which is good, since other critics of SM have latched onto this point before
SM going now, focusing on rape, theft, assault, murder as the four forbidden behaviors. If someone wants to be stolen from, it can't be theft, etc.
Property rights are validated by UPB because we own ourselves and the effects of our actions, SM says. It's his book, he says, so he's responsible for the book and its effects.
(aside: it occurs to me that the four forbiddens boil down to 2, which is no physical harm and no property violation)

RR asks SM to steel man Kant's categorical imperative and hypothetical imperative.
SM on Kant now -- seems a bit flatfooted here. "If I'm the strongest man in the village, I'm happy to have a strength competition be how resources are allocated." Taking one's own behavior as a universal principle isn't UPB. Not sure how this relates to Kant...
SM goes after Kant on his fealty to political authority. If your moral philosophy allows Hitler to command you to kill Jews, then you're not moral, really. Kant, Sm says, sits at the core of some of 20th c. totalitarianism.
RR goes now: hypothetical and categorial imperative. the former is a behavior iff you want to meet goal; latter is shoulds. He gives examples. This is a distinction SM did not make and it's an important indication of where SM has a bit of a lacuna in his philosophical knowledge
They're both being overly polite right now. Just saying.
SM says religion answered the demands of the categorial imperative. Says he and RR are both atheists. Points out that there's big overlap between the two of them. Religion works as a justification for the religion but not for them.
SM: it's an argument from authority (correct). Neither SM nor RR (nor the audience) is satisfied with edicts from a supernatural being
SM kinda going on now. Be nice if he would get to the point. Wonder if he isn't already trying to run down the clock.
SM: Three hundred years of civil war in Europe over religion.

1517 to 1689 (roughly) is like half of that
SM now talking about rioters on street. They are "overwhelming the body politic," and that's why their debate is important.

SM asks RR if he wants to add anything. He agrees that there is a need for objective reality. Both are moral realists. RR says SM steel manned his pov
SM riffing now on RR's critique of UPB. Comes down to a violation of the is/ought dichotomy. (I think from Hume?) There are universal laws in nature but nothing in nature that dictates a "should"
Nothing like virtue or truth in nature, he goes on. The concepts we cherish the most don't exist in nature, and trying to get them directly is a fool's errand.

SM doing an admirable job here of steelmanning RR, IMO
RR agrees that SM steel mans his position well. RR says he does believe truth exists. He clarifies Hume's position -- his reading of Hume is that one *can* get oughts from reality but only on hypothetical imperatives. E.g., if you don't want to go to prison, you ought not murder
SM: But what if I don't care or can get away with it? When the power of the state is acquired, one can do this (this is SM's basic anti-statist "anarchist argument).
(Kinda wish they'd get to the nitty gritty here. They're just nodding along here at this point...)
SM now turns to questions/definitions. Asks RR: Does objective reality exist?

RR says yes.
SM: What is the validity of reason?

RR: Requests clarification

SM: Your channel's name suggests that you value rationality. What is its value.

RR says he's happy to use whatever language SM wants
RR quotes from UPB (p. 10), i.e., no need to reinvent the wheel by redefining every single word. Goes on a bit about what could possibly happen if they did get very granular.

SM says reason is the art of noncontradictory identification
SM: Reason is a way of validating whehter our thoughts connect w/reality, because reality is objective and consistent, quantum, etc., aside. Moral philosophy is more concerned with sense data, empiricism, etc.
SM: In other words, reason is a necessary but not sufficient condition for determining whether our thoughts can match reality. Russell's teapot is a good example of what *not* to argue over.

Again, he's kinda going on here. RR much more economical with his words
SM (still!): now talking about dreams, but those aren't reality.

I think we all got it, guy. Maybe move on now?
SM talking about subjective vs. objective opinions vs. basically just being plain wrong. I like guppies more than goldfish (former) vs Guppies not mammals (latter)
Jeez Louise... They need a chess timer for this guy.

SM going now about contradiction and what it tells us about identifying truth.
RR finally goes and says he agrees. Can't say for sure that there's no God, no teapot, etc., but for all intents & purposes, sure. Perfectly reasonable and rational.
Finally the divergence?

SM: Here's where we diverge. 3 things RR talked about, 1 agreed, 2 not agreed. Teapot around Mars is unlikely but not impossible. But square circle and traditional concept of God SM says are contradictory.
Hard to see how he'd include God in there. RR responding now. We used to believe we knew everything about universal laws, and now we know differently. Says that the more he learned, the more he learned how little he knows, so makes him cautious.
RR much more willing to accept the possibility of being wrong here. Is willing to concede SM's 2 other points.

SM turns to truth. RR says 2 ways of looking at truth: factual statements (the earth is a sphere); ways in which things work (evolution by natural selection)
RR: Our relationship w/reality is our understanding of what actually is.

SM: Gold standard of truth is logically consistent and maps onto reality.
SM riffs now on how he's been warning about the left and racist discord for 15 years and apparently he's being proved true (!)

SM: What premises are implicitly accepted in debating?
RR says he'd like to point out where SM equivocates.

Kinda say this one coming. 16 or 17 flaws in UPB, 4 of which are "game-ending"

Finally getting into it
RR about to get into UPB and SM interrupts. SM seems to want to put the cart before the horse, but RR prevails.
RR: Can you explain the equivocation fallacy

SM: I'll let you take that.

RR explains it. (remember Burgis did this)
RR says 2 or 3 definitions of UPB are there are there are equivocation fallacy arises from there. RR asks for latitude in putting it out there. SM concedes
RR on SM's p. 32 on preferences. Reads a lengthy excerpt.

RR puts down a flag. Pretty brilliant. Having laid down Kant's two imperatives, he hints that SM's point about eating arsenic is hypothetical but not imperative.
But on next page, RR continues, he's gone on to talk about shoulds, i.e., prescriptive, rather than descriptive, as with before.

RR has made a very clear demonstration of where SM is inconsistently in his language. SM seeming not to get it.
SM pushing back here, saying he doesn't want to be repetitive in his writing; RR says he appreciates that but jumps to p. 54 and a *third* definition of UPB, an all/nothing proposition.
RR says SM has used multiple definitions.

SM says but I'm using if clauses. I have a lot of if statements, but the way they play out is in the service of universal statements.
Issue of a man in concentration camp comes up. SM takes issue with this -- once you have a gun to your head, you're no longer in a moral situation. Hostage made to rob bank is not morally responsible. This is a fair point, but it's hard to believe that RR isn't ready for this
RR states it as a hypothetical imperative: don't lie if you want to be liked

SM says this is not universal

RR points out that the example of duress disproves SM's conditions of universal (i think?)
SM back to basic point of murder can't be UPB because a person who wants to be murdered can't be murdered. Again, hard to think that RR hasn't considered this wrinkle.
RR points out that the presciption of behavior can vary from person to person. He points out that UPB is basically Kant's hypothetical imperative because of its reliance on if clauses.

SM: Can theft be universal preferable?
RR: Can everyone want to steal and be stolen from at once?

SM: Right

RR: No.

SM: OK, good

RR: But you're still tying it with if clauses
SM: the real issue where you and I part ways is that RR rejects the self-detonation argument

RR: No, it comes down to how UPB is being defined. I agree with all your descriptive statements, but none of them have to do with morality. All of your moral statements are ifs.
SM: IF you accept UPB as a statement, you must reject the Big 4. Are you saying they have nothign to do w/moraity

RR: No, but now you're expanding the definition of UPB to anything that's self-contradictory
RR suggests they go back to the implicit assumptions and identify which are UPB and which are not

SM turns to premises explicitly accepted.
SM: RR and I decide to go to Vegas. Vegas is the truth in this analogy. RR and I agree that objective reality is exists, truth and rationality are valuable, etc. This is the debate. If the bus gets hijacked to SFO, we don't say we're in Vegas.
SM: There's also better and worse ways to get there. Wihtout the destination, routes can't be better or worse, but once we decide on Vegas, we can determine which route is better. That's the is/ought dichotomy -- ought is the route.
RR: Lotta ifs in there. You're not bridging is/ought

SM: I think it is

RR: I can't communicate to you that language has no meaning using language, right?

SM: yes
RR: What do you call what we just described?

SM: To deny that language has meaning would remove you from the debate.

RR: Where in the underlying premises do you identify UPB?

SM: Self-contradictory statements are false

(But what about the barber paradox?)
SM: It's UPB to make consistent statements if you wish to be accurate

Some discourse here on UPB. UPB is two things

RR: If you're saying UPB is two things, then you're proving my point about equivocation

SM tries to distinguish science from scientific method
RR: No, that's two things: science and scientific method

SM trying now to delineate UPB and subtypes of UPB

RR pushing back pretty hard on this. Retuning to implicit assumptions
Lotta back and forth here over consistence, assumptions, etc. RR points out there he doesn't see any should statements

SM: If someone says I want to debate you but don't believe you exist, that's self-contradiction

RR: Yes

SM: There's your should

RR: Where?
It looks like they're going to run ashore on defining "should." I agree that you don't want to do something, but is that a should? SM goes back to "ifs," but this again is the hypothetical imperative
They're coming to loggerheads quickly here. Not to pay myself on the back too much, but I saw this coming
SM getting exasperated a bit. RR doubling down on it all hinging on his ifs.
SM strangely seeming to concede a large point by stating that morality isn't actually objectively. IF that's where Hume is, then SM accept that.

But if you're debating me, then you have to be conceding something.
RR keeps returning to should/if/hypothetical/categorical. The language distinction not helpful unless one considers prescriptive/description

It's quickly becoming a semantic argument.
The bottom here is quickly becoming that SM hasn't considered Hume/Kant in constructing UPB, while RR is pretty much wedded to their moral philosophizing in construing SM.
Just as an aside here, this is what is deeply problematic about SM posing as moral philosopher. In ignoring/disregarding major earlier (and relatively recent) voices in moral philosophy, he's very much like the person who decides to call himself a physicist but ignore
Newton and Einstein or a game theorist while ignoring Nash.
They agree to disagree to move the ball downfield a bit.

RR's second critique of UPB now on begging the question, smuggling the premises, etc. RR gives the definition.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question
RR moves to p. 40 of UPB. SM's first premise here is begging the question.

SM: But I provide supporting arguments

I imagine RR is going to object to the ordering of the syllogism.
Yeah, nailed that one.

SM very much objects to this. Lotta pushback. I'm being quoted out of context, You're boring, etc.

Again, a deficit in SM's training, here in logic.
SM claims he's being ambushed. Classic. They agree to go past the issue, but RR insists on the proper construction of a syllogism.
RR finally pushing back at SM's ambush claim. Maybe do this another time, SM suggests.

RR says there's four question-begging instances followed by a non sequitur.

Again, this is where Molyneux is just so poorly trained.
Now SM asking questions. Interesting that he's now reading RR's arguments to him but took issue with RR doing same.
RR returns to the if clause issue. He has remarkably good focus on this issue and can answer easily when his own writing is challenged on these grounds.
Looking at the chat in the debate, there's about a 2:1 ratio of arguments seeing RR as generally right here and seeing SM as dishonest, dodging, unprepared, etc. You love to see it.
They're going at some length over one of RR"s earlier argument, which isn't really very interesting without a directly available point of reference.
SM denies a monetary incentive for his work (one of his greatest hits), says he's corrected his past mistakes, etc.

Interesting: RR says SM has no public incentive to be right about UPB. RR slowly but surely putting SM up against the ropes
Molyneux seems not to understand that being up on his own work would be evidence of wanting to be publicly correct.
SM going over RR' s video titles, presumably to make the case that there is hypocrisy in RR's approach. Acknowledges RR for correcting the record on controversial video on trans participation in sports
I'm gonna have to tap out here very soon. Didn't think theyd be going quite this long. Obviously it's pretty clear to me that RR did the better job here. He set out the terms and conditions of his argument and then deployed it consistently and well.
SM was clearly caught disarmed or unprepared at least twice -- on Hume/Kant and on the logic of his own arguments. It's not hard to understand why he blocked . @BenBurgis when Burgis first attacked his book for essentially the same faultss.
At some point perhaps I'll add to this thread to summarize what transpires after I log off. If you're still reading or have been reading, thanks for doing so. TTFN
You can follow @darwin_thames.
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