It's very unfortunate that Macron and Merkel apparently couldn't agree on a joint position with regard to this major transatlantic event. Shows how far Berlin and Paris are away from each other, despite the recent big effort to work together. https://twitter.com/herszenhorn/status/1266505203655860224

The other big takeaway from this article: Trump and Merkel disagree on NATO, Nord Stream 2 gas and relations with China. These tensions would continue under a president Biden -- even if the tone would dramatically change, and with it the character of the bilateral relationship.

Important that all three are related to the geopolitical positioning of Germany. US on a more competitive track now, Germany mentally still living in the world of globalisation, transformation, convergence.

For Germany, very hard to move on, despite the fact that Russia and China have become neo-imperialist powers threatening neighbors. For Germany, the post-1989 order was perfect: opened the world for its highly competitive business, and turned everybody into friends.

Merkel is, despite her toughness on Russia, very much wedded to this approach. But so is Germany as a whole. How to reconcile the new geopolitical competition with the vision and the reality of globalisation: this is big question Germany needs to address in the next years.

Can economic globalisation continue despite geopolitical tensions? Is buying gas from Russia and selling Volkswagen to China easing these tensions, or is it just strenghtening "systemic rivals" which are ultimately threatening the order on which Germany relies?

Can Germany as a major economic player and a key power in Europe keep its head down and stay out of major clashes if geopolitical competition is back? Does it have to take sides, or can it chart a "third way", together with Paris, London, other Europeans?

A major factor in all this will be the US. If there is a president in the White House who is in favor of "partnership in leadership", like Obama was, a joint front made of major liberal democracies may emerge (Biden's "free world") -- Europeans, Asians, and US in the lead.

A second Trump term would leave Germany without US anchor. It would certainly not move into the autocratic camp, but navigate around contentious issues trying to save as much as possible from the old world while feeling to weak to push back against Russia and China.

Would a second Trump term lead to the formation of a European or EU geopolitical pole, or center? Experience with Trump I shows this is not happening. US strategic leadership has traditionally united Europe geopolitically -- left alone Europeans pursue their distinct strategies.

A more tense geopolitical competition is rather leading to less unity in Europe. Germany and France profoundly disagree over Russia, Italy and France over Libya, no joint China approach has emerged.

Bottom line: A Biden presidency could lead to a new balance between autocratic challengers and a global free world-coalition -- with pillars in Asia and Europe, and with leadership input from the US.

Trump II by contrast would lead to less international cooperation, less coherence, more opportunities for China (and perhaps Russia) to push medium powers around and force small countries into submission, more conflict and insecurity. More chaos, less order.