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I've been so stressed and overwhelmed all week I hadn't noticed my research on military-civil fusion (from an essay in @Strategy_Bridge) was quoted in this piece by @ewong and @julianbarnes yesterday. I wanted to share a few thoughts on this latest policy. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/china-hong-kong-trump-student-visas.html
By way of disclosure and/or background, I am among those who has argued for some time that the U.S. government should undertake targeted countermeasures in response to the threat of tech transfer that PRC plans and practices have presented for years. https://www.cnas.org/publications/congressional-testimony/testimony-before-the-house-permanent-select-committee-on-intelligence
By "targeted," I mean precise and careful, responding to an accurate understanding of the near-term threat and long-term challenge, rather than ill-informed or indiscriminate, and ideally avoiding overreach or collateral damage to U.S. values and competitiveness in the process.
I recognize policy tends to be, at best, a blunt instrument that can have crude effects in ways that are inherently imperfect and suboptimal. Arguably, that tendency reinforces the importance of care and caution in any policy measure.
As an initial reaction, I'd tend to agree, or at least don't disagree, with the purpose and intention of this policy proclamation released today by the Trump administration. I'll explain a few reasons why, but also elaborate on why I have serious concerns. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-suspension-entry-nonimmigrants-certain-students-researchers-peoples-republic-china/
There have been incidents when PLA officers who concealed their ongoing military service and affiliation were tasked to support ongoing military research, as in this recent incident. https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china
Even without indicators of outright wrongdoing, when the PLA can leverage scientists with expertise and experience in American universities and laboratories, that talent can support Chinese military research projects. There have been deliberate attempts to pursue such recruitment
As @ASPI_ICPC research by @alexjoske has highlighted, NUDT has sent sizable numbers of scientists overseas, including to the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and Germany, among others. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/picking-flowers-making-honey
