(THREAD) The just-released December 2016 Michael Flynn-Sergey Kislyak transcript deserves its own thread—not a quick-hit analysis—so here it is. The transcript itself is linked to in the first tweet of the thread. I hope you'll pass this on to anyone you think may be interested.

1/ Here's a link to the transcript: https://twitter.com/dnvolz/status/1266468183520751621

2/ The first question is, is there a Logan Act violation? A federal criminal statute, the act—used twice in the past to indict—criminalizes private citizens negotiating U.S. policy with a foreign power. Whether it's to be charged or not, it's relevant as an investigatory matter.

3/ Any law enforcement officer looking at this transcript and wondering if there's reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime has been committed would answer in the affirmative. Which, again, is a threshold *investigatory* question—not a matter of deciding whether to prosecute.

4/ Criminal investigation is part of a bifurcated process with criminal prosecution (as we all know from LAW & ORDER—a terrible show that at least gets that much correct). Investigators don't make prosecutorial decisions, they *investigate*. Here, the FBI absolutely had to do so.

5/ Flynn is self-evidently negotiating US policy with a foreign power—a particularly *egregious* example of this, as the power he's negotiating with is a *hostile foreign power* that had just *attacked America* and the item being negotiated is whether that foe should be punished.

6/ A good tell is the phrase, "What I would ask Russia to do is..." And Flynn makes specific demands: "Don't go any further than you have to." He uses the term "us," by which he seeks to accrue to the Trump transition team the authority of an acting presidential administration.

7/ Michael Flynn seeks to have U.S.-Russian relations unfold in a way that "we'll understand that message," where "we" is a group of people with no sanctioned political power and "message" refers to official policy decisions to be taken—impacting the U.S. directly—by the Kremlin.

8/ It's fine for Flynn to say the Trump administration hoped to have a positive relationship with the Kremlin (or, fine-*ish*, given that the Kremlin had just tried to help Trump win an election via illegal means). But he cannot discuss *policy*. It's that simple—and he knew it.

9/ There will be a lot of discussion about what Flynn is referring to when he says that Trump and the Kremlin have "a common enemy" (he uses here the term "we," which he has consistently used, in the conversation, to refer to Trump's incoming administration). So who is the enemy?

10/ The easiest explanation is that Michael Flynn is here referring to terrorism generally—and certainly, it is known that Flynn wanted (and still wants) the U.S. to partner with Putin on counter-terrorism. But the way this comment unfolds leaves a number of questions unanswered.

11/ First, as I wrote about in PROOF OF CONSPIRACY, major-media investigative reporting confirms that Flynn had a *number* of clandestine contacts with Kislyak both post- *and* pre-election. These contacts are *all* problematic and create a context for this December conversation.

12/ It's clear one reason Flynn doesn't have to say who Trump's "common enemy" with Putin is, is he and Kislyak have a shorthand that confirms their prior conversations—the first one that we know of coming at Kislyak's home in December *2015* (prior to Flynn's dinner with Putin).

13/ So clearly Sergey Kislyak already knows exactly *how* and *why* Trump's political team wants to partner with the Kremlin—and as I said, *some* of that may relate to counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East. But dammit if Flynn doesn't express himself very unusually here.

14/ For instance, if Flynn is describing "terrorism," it's odd for him to say "we have a problem with it in this country" *separately* from saying "we definitely have a problem with it in the Middle East." Is he referring, in a 2016 call, to September 11, 2001? Or something else?

15/ Of course he also says "you have a problem with it," which is consistent with the idea he's discussing terrorism broadly writ—as Putin generally considers any dissent from his autocratic reign to be some variation or other of domestic terrorism. But there is another question.

16/ He says "basically we [Trump and the Kremlin] have to take these enemies on that we have." Again, sure, one could imagine he means ISIS fighters, though it's an incredibly simplistic (and false) way to imagine the byzantine alliances in the Middle East (e.g., Syria and Iraq).

17/ On December 31, Kislyak makes a comment that will get a lot of attention as well, saying that we (the Kremlin) "found" that "these actions" (presumably Obama's sanctions) "targeted not only...Russia, but also...the president[-]elect." What does "found" mean? An intel finding?

18/ Kislyak's implication is that Russia has evidence it can supply (or at a minimum has much more to say) on the topic of Obama's sanctions—which punished Russian cyberattacks during the 2016 election—actually being intended to "target" Trump. Here's why I find that significant.

19/ The Flynn-Kislyak discussion, across a few days in late December 2016, is about "common enemies" and the Obama administration, and here's Kislyak identifying the Obama administration having targeted both the Kremlin and Trump—clearly establishing for the two a "common enemy."

20/ So what we have is an illegal conversation—that is to say, a *negotiation* that is *criminal* in nature—that underscores prior illicit contact between the parties, and has as its subtext that Trump and the Kremlin both see the Democrats as an obstacle and/or a "common enemy."

CONCLUSION/ There are just two intercepts from a *year-plus* course of clandestine negotiation Flynn and Kislyak had. But even on their own, *yes*, it's enough of a basis—even if there were *nothing else*, and there's so much else!—to launch, maintain, or extend an investigation.