Interesting analysis of the hardening UK position on China. One point it suggests – and where I’m changing my own mind – is that in long run COVID seems likely to hurt, not help, China’s geopolitical position. 1/ https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/escaping-the-dragon-the-governments-new-approach-to-china

Earlier in crisis, there was lots of talk on how US stumbling and China’s ‘mask diplomacy’ could advance China’s global influence. I agreed with this at the time, but now I think there are countervailing factors that will end up mattering more. 2/ https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order

In addition to UK, EU position also hardening, Australia too, and lots of countries announcing new COVID-related investment screening mechanisms clearly aimed at China. (US too of course -- see Trump today -- but that was already baked in) 3/ https://twitter.com/ajwsmall/status/1266365095648677888

Common factor is view that the current structure of the global economy, which places China at the heart of integrated global value chains, creates vulnerabilities, and governments should be wary of dependence on China. 4/

Some of this is about China’s actions in the crisis, but a lot of it is simply other countries’ reassessing the importance of ‘strategic autonomy’ (in EU’s words). Because of China’s position in global economy, it has the most to lose. 5/ https://twitter.com/simongerman600/status/1226117270742630406?lang=en

In other words, COVID was an exogenous shock to the global system that is prompting governments around the world to think more about the vulnerabilities that arise from globalization. Many are deciding they are overly exposed to China, and taking corrective action. 6/

Of course, China could have done a better job reassuring others that these interdependencies weren’t a source of vulnerability. So in part this is its own doing. 7/ https://twitter.com/geoffreygertz/status/1265327001071685632

But I think it’s also in part an accident of history that the COVID shock came along at a particular time when Western dependencies on China were high, but not so high they couldn’t still be wound back at a reasonable cost. /8

Counterfactuals are tricky, but plausible if COVID happened 15 years earlier or later wouldn’t have as big an impact on Western positions toward China; in 2005 wouldn’t have seen need to diversify from China, by 2035 Chinese tech would be so ingrained would be impossible 9/end