I'll jump on this. Yes, China's actions are lending cred to offensive realism (OR) - but not in the way one might think. A short thread. https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1266081503139725313

DISCLAIMER: remember that OR - as a structural theory of IR - is not going to explain everything (e.g., the timing of specific Chinese actions) about FOREIGN POLICY. It can shed light on foreign policy, but it won't suffice for fine-grained detail.

That said, OR expects all states to be revisionist actors in some way, but also risk-avoidant. This is distinct from, e.g., Organski and Kugler, who expect revisionists fairly aggressive once they pass a magic threshold (80% of the leading state, if memory serves).

If all actors are cost-averse revisionists, we then expect (1) the scope of revisionism to grow as their rel power expands, even as (2) they are sensitive to the risks involved (e.g., seeking to avoid a war today until their strength grows, expecting surer gains tomorrow)

As a result - as I discussed in my @CornellPress book - a lot depends on both the distribution of power and fine-grained military balance. In multipolarity, even OR states seek partners & pursue cooperative strategies; in bipolarity, they still await a favorable military balance.

These insights shed light on PRC behavior. For example, back in the 1990s, China faced what was effectively a multipolar regional environment: Japan, Russia, the US, and potentially others could harm its security.

Lo and behold, this corresponded with a period when China welcomed a US presence in the region -- "keeping the cork in the Japanese bottle" and all that.

As Chinese power has grown, of course, its assertiveness and, to a lesser degree, its ambitions have changed. We can't understate this. Still, what's striking is not what's changed, but how little has altered.

As Taylor Fravel notes, for instance, Chinese territorial ambitions have altered on the margins. Still, it's far from, say, an obvious push for large-scale new territorial holdings.

Ditto, Chinese military spending per SIPRI (though there are obvious debates here) has been constant for decades - its military is expanding, but not clearly related to an increased rate of mil investment so much as growing scope as China's economy has grown.

Likewise, and as @Fiona_Cunning shows, its nuclear force remains limited in size and scope (certainly compared to US and Sov forces at a comparable point in their rise).

And, while China may be seeking to undermine US alliances, it has not aimed to construct its own alliance system.

I could go on, but the point is that China may be revisionist, but it's also not throwing a lot of effort (relative to what it might be doing) into the exercise.

Per a revised OR framework, this makes sense. After all, China remains weaker than the US in relative terms. Hence, it's strategic for the PRC to pursue "limited predation" -- seeking cumulative gains at the US' expense, but operating below a threshold that may cause war.

Indeed, we expect this sort of limited revisionism to continue until if and when China can de facto brush aside US opposition with no real risk of conflict - an unlikely scenario b/c of mil tech + nukes. (Not coincidentally, the US therefore has may defense/deterrence options.)

To this we could add that China may not unreasonably still worry about other actors - India, Japan, etc. - that may be able to harm China today or in the future. Avoiding steps that catalyze more counterbalancing - and maybe avoid an overt break with the US - may be advantageous.

In sum, and consistent with OR, China's revisionism has grown as the distribution of power has shifted & attitude towards the US has changed as its 'need' for the US morphed, even though the degree of revisionism remains limited.

None of this is to say OR is "right" -- but it does help us understand the drivers, dynamics, nature, and potential futures of a rising China.