I read it. Since she went with classic Nitze, I would reply with: What do we mean by +effective arms control+? Rose claims that means getting closer to "a long-sought goal of nuclear arms control— controlling and eliminating warheads." Nothing could further from arms control./1

Warheads not on weapons are targets. Period. If in periods of tension merely having them is the problem, and you seek their elimination, then you are not in the right lecture hall. That's over in the disarmament department. Let me explain more of my objection to her thinking./2

I respect Rose. Her record speaks for itself and mine is minuscule. But that doesn't alleviate my serious concern that her policy direction results in problems that have, in fact, moved us further away from warheads, but worse, away from verifying them on missiles./3

I agree with her that every treaty is effectively verifiable based on its terms and limits, on what is prohibited and permitted by each. In this regard, AMB Billingslea is reviving old debates. But he's not wrong when he notes there are issues with NST verification./4

Now, how he describes the solution is where I part company with him. How Rose describes merits is where I differ with her. Don't think including China in Geneva and letting it expire will fix it, unless fix is some kind of mafia euphemism. But warheads?/5

Gosh, I just fundamentally don't understand how keeping missile throw weight, telemetry and full telemetry at that as per START I, +hurts+ progress on warhead elimination. In fact, upload and download give you a better range than counting them on a few missiles each year./6

Let's also stipulate that New START's first three years were its best. Confidence declined every year after that, as Russia populated its forces with new missiles for which we will never get full telemetry since New START actually BANS full data exchange. Not good./7

I also object to saying that by getting rid of things Russians didn't like in START I we made anything better. Since when was that ever a negotiating goal? It wasn't. We are trying to reduce the risk of major war, even when we don't get along with Moscow. Nothing more./8

I cannot go where I cannot go here, but I have been pleasantly surprised by the views on the inside about how the treaty worked. While I remain a bit of a stickler, too, I also get that this isn't just about my own agenda, but part of much a bigger one./9

But I have never thought that what Russians objected to doing, or that they could not do here, in the US, under START I, amounted to much that was serious compared to what we found there. To her credit, Rose did place the solutions from START I JCIC in New START./10

I just can't detail them here. But even those novelties don't remedy the fact that, under New START, we have vastly less confidence in our ability to independently confirm warheads on new Russian missiles, or things like Avangard. But nor would getting rid of New START./11