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5 observations from @MujMash's outstanding article on why the Taliban have managed to outlast the US
THREAD https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/world/asia/taliban-afghanistan-war.html?smid=tw-share
THREAD https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/world/asia/taliban-afghanistan-war.html?smid=tw-share
1. The Taliban have suffered extraordinary casualties yet remain a coherent fighting force. The article estimates a 25% annual attrition rate for a force of 50k. Back-of-the-envelope math says that 137,500 KIA since 2009. Even a more conservative loss ratio of 10% is 55,000 KIA
2. How did the Taliban keep recruiting? Locally-based chain recruitment, in which current fighters vouched for family and relatives to help create a reserve system.
3. Did they fight for money? Not really. Most fighters don't receive a regular salary. But living + travel expenses were covered, often via local taxation. In Alingar, local commanders sent 20% of taxes they collected to senior mil authorities, used the other 80% to fund forces
Many fighters, and even senior commanders, actually held regular jobs alongside the soldiering duties. This has major implications for how we think about vocational training and employment programs as tools for "winning hearts & minds" and shifting opportunity costs of rebellion
4. Speaking of aid agencies, it's clear (as has been known for some time) that many organizations continue to fund schools, clinics, activities, etc. in Taliban-controlled areas with the permission, and participation, of Taliban commanders
5. The power of WhatsApp. Military and political wings of the Taliban used it to coordinate their stance at the negotiation table (often slowing down these negotiations). Commanders also use it to maintain discipline among rank-and-file in a highly decentralized insurgency.
It's not clear, however, that this decentralized system of monitoring and sanctioning will be enough to allow the political wing to control military commanders if/when the Taliban finally win
Yes, we need to take Taliban statements + interviews with a grain (or bucket) of salt. But it's interesting to note how many of these insights by @MujMash jibe with conclusions reached by scholars over the past 10 years (or more) about the drivers of Taliban insurgency
