I wrote an article a few years ago with the title "Taiwan can win a war with China." It went mildly viral, and all that.

Barring some pretty massive internal changes in Taiwan's defense plans and training... I do not think I would write that same article today.

All the stuff I wrote in that article about the logistical, psychological, and geographical barriers to invasion are still true. Largest amphibious invasion in human history, cannot be kept secret, only a few potential landing sites, ridiculous logistical tail, current weapons

favor defenders, all of that is still true.

What has changed is my estimation of the Taiwanese political system's ability to impose serious costs on the TW population needed to prepare the country for a potential war.

A lot of perverse incentives inside the military, in the party politics system, etc. These people need to have the attitude of the Estonians and they just don't.

That could change. Tsai Ing-wen could make this a focus. The United States could offer training. But if they don't...

A lot of war preparation devices--the universal conscription system, the reserves, army logistics and training, the procurement of all those tanks--are more show than substance. Thats the crux of the problem. I spent year of 2019 in Taiwan and it made me quite cynical about the

current state. And it is pretty sad because it is unnecessary. The Taiwanese *could* win that war against China -- or at least make the costs of winning it so ridiculously high the PRC wouldn't dare --

but the ordinary people are not committed to sacrificing to this goal and are quite defeatist, the political leadership has never had the guts to ask for such sacrifices, and the military leadership--especially for the Army--is 20 years behind the times.

I have met so many talented individuals in the ROC military, in the DPP, even in the KMT, who understand what is necessary and are committed to achieving it, but they are sidelined again and again and again.

I strongly suspect that outside intervention--that is, signs of commitment from the Americans, with strings attached--might give these folks the leverage to do what needs to be done to save Taiwan.

But it is kind of a catch-22: many Americans do not want to tie the US to a sinking boat and so want no real commitments at all; but the boat will sink unless the people on it have hope that their reforms will matter. How do they judge that? American commitment.

But just as bad are the Americans who want all kinds of showy commitments that ask nothing of the Taiwanese. This is a long term recipe for disaster, fooling some TW into thinking all is well.

What TW probably needs is real substantive commitments "with strings attached." We will put ourselves on the line for you *if you take your own defense more seriously than you have thusfar.*

I have explained some of the existing problems here https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/taiwan/2019-09-17/taiwans-defense-strategy-doesnt-make-military-sense

Paul Huang has some more https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/15/china-threat-invasion-conscription-taiwans-military-is-a-hollow-shell/

Wendell Minnick too https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-save-taiwan-itself-48122

Also Philip Caruso: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/17/defense-navy-tsai-ing-wen-xi-jinping-taiwan-needs-more-than-election-victories-fend-off-china/

Again the problems Huang, Minnick. Caruso, et. al. have pointed out are easy to see and the solutions are obvious. Question that matters is political will and political incentives to summon that will.