80 years ago 1st Armd Div were about to go into action. This short thread looks at the development of the armoured division in the British Army. 1/

Post Great War there was lots of heat generated but not so much light on the way in which the Army should organise & equip. Despite some ideas that verged on science fiction, by 1925 the idea of a mobile combined arms force attacking in depth was starting to crystalise. 2/

Field Service Regulations described 3 main roles for tanks: close support to advancing infantry, destruction of enemy tanks, and to exploit a success. FSR also noted tanks’ limitations, and it grasped the mutual benefits of tanks and infantry working together. 3/

But these thoughts were put on hold, partly due to strategic inertia, partly because the technology wasn’t there. So the tank remained for direct support of infantry in the assault. 4/

In 1927 the Experimental Force was formed on Salisbury Plain with Armd Cars & Lt tanks, a Bn of tanks, a lorry-borne MG Bn, motorised fld arty, mech RE & Signals units. When the CIGS visited the experiment he delivered a stirring speech which hinted at radical transformation. 5/

His vision retained traditional cavalry & infantry divs but he wanted a new strategic formation, an armoured division, but he did not want to rush into this new adventure, advocating a cautious advance. 6/

Liddell Hart was critical of the early exercises observing that they were simply replicating traditional methods of warfare but using mechanised forces rather than doing anything revolutionary (or as we might say today, nothing innovative). 7/

The force was disbanded in 1928. The EF should have been the building block from which the Army grew its combined arms fmns but halfway between the end of one World War and the start of the next, the Army still had no real idea of how to combine tanks with other arms. 8/

Perhaps more importantly it did not know how it was going to investigate the way forward. 9/

In 1931 the experiments restarted with 4 RTC Bns were grouped into a Tank Bde. The fmn was made permanent in 1933/34 with Percy Hobart in charge. He was described variously as ‘the leading tactician in the RTC’ and ‘the most ardent and radical member of the RTC avant-garde’. 10/

He was clear that the primary role of armour was strategic deep strike ops & he saw little need for other arms especially infantry. His influence on the CIGS was obviously strong as the latest War Office study on the Tank Brigade downplayed the infantry support role of tanks. /11

Towards the end of 1934 the tank brigade was brought together with a mech inf bde, a mech arty bde and numerous supporting arms to form the Mobile Force. The cooperation between tank & inf bdes was proposed to the infantry commander, Lindsay, in a letter from Hobart in 1933. /12

This is the same Lindsay (George, a tankie) who, <10 years earlier, could not be considered anything but a tank zealot, and especially so at the expense of infantry. How he was given comd of an inf bde I don't know. 13/

By the time his and Hobart’s brigades came together their views were starting to diverge. Hobart was maintaining the tank-only mechanised formations line whereas Lindsay was proposing an all arms grouping together with integrated air power. 14/

Although Lindsay appears to have been proposing what we know as an Armd or Mech Div, his view on how it would fight was still firmly rooted in his RTC upbringing, as he saw the majority of the combat being conducted by the tanks on their own. His prejudices were still there. 15/

In '36 CIGS ordered the formation of a Mobile Division which became 1st Armd Div. Out went half of the inf & some cav. The new div consisted of an armd cav bde (lt tanks), a tank bde (mediums but designed to be equipped with cruisers), & a sp gp which held the single inf bn! 16/

Why the Army Council reduced the infantry to such a small number is not entirely clear but it could be deduced that by doing so they maintained the cavalry concept of tank warfare and at the same time acceded to the Tank Corps view of the independent role for the division. 17/

This is a key fact, not without irony. It is one of the few areas that the cavalry and Tank Corps agreed upon but it proved to be a very bad idea once war broke out. 18/