THREAD:

1-Recently, there have been reports claiming that #Iran has shifted toward an active approach in #Libya, supporting Haftar’s forces in their push to take over #Tripoli. Last week, #Israel’s UN envoy accused Iran of sending anti-tank munitions to Haftar…

2-The very fact that such reports first came from #Israeli sources should make one think twice about their credibility. Meanwhile, the new state of heated rivalry between #Iran & #Turkey over #Syria was enough reason for the Turkish media to start maneuvering on those reports…

3-But what’s #Iran’s position on #Libya in the first place? IR doesn’t have any special interest in that country. Libya fits neither into IR’s grand ideological agenda (axis of resistance/Shia Crescent) nor its long-term geopolitical plans (esp. access to Mediterranean)…

4-Apart from that, #Iran’s worsening economic situation + it’s lengthy/costly direct & indirect involvements in #Syria, #Iraq, #Yemen, #Lebanon, would make its involvement in #Libya close to impossible, even if such an ambition was there…

5-BTW Libyan crisis has been a complex scene for #Iran. Taking side with GNA would mean antagonizing its partner #Russia. Also, rivalry with #Turkey in #Syria would not allow this scenario. After all, Ankara’s obsession with Libya would create opportunities for IR in Syria…

6-Meanwhile supporting Haftar would mean helping #Iran’s own rivals #UAE & #SaudiArabia enhance their regional influence. That would be the last outcome IR would be willing to see from the Libyan crisis…

7-However, if #Iran was to choose, it would take GNA’s side, not Haftar’s. An influential Iranian think thank @TehranInstitute published an analysis last year, assessing the risks and opportunities of the Libyan crisis for IR. Here is the link: https://tisri.org/?id=2zj19q52 

8-The report warns that the spread of #Saudi influence in North Africa + Arab-Israeli rapprochement would mean the overall increase of the power and influence of Iran’s two main rivals, Saudi Arabia and Israel in the region…

9-While admitting that Iran has a minimum potential to impact developments in Libya, the report concludes: “between bad and worse options, i.e. empowerment of #Turkey and #SaudiArabia, the dominance of the forces close to Turkey would cost Iran less…”

10-Thus, at the end of the day, IR would see siding with GNA a more logical option than supporting Haftar. The combination of Saudi & Israeli factors in IR’s calculations would also partly explain why recent claims on Iran’s Libya involvement came from the Israeli sources…

11-But who brought #Iran-made weapons to #Libya? Answer is simple: Assad! Attempting to hit a blow to Turkey, Assad started expanding ties with Haftar. He let Haftar to open a diplomatic office in #Syria. Who would believe these “brotherly” ties are limited to diplomatic front?

12-This is also an indication that Assad is not always acting in ways that its supporters, #Iran and #Russia expect him to act. Plus, regional equations are more complex to be reduced to media speculations and unconfirmed claims!
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