Technical Support Division (TSD)
Indian Army’s top covert operations unit that was disavowed

They were recruited in the wake of the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai in 2008, to stage counter-attacks on enemy targets. Super spies who sneaked into terrorist hideouts, blasted their depots+

++ and did other covert jobs The story of the top-secret spy unit, officially the Technical Support Division, goes back to the days immediately after 26/11. Rattled by the audacity of the attack, the then National Security Adviser++

M.K Narayanan, met heads of all spy and security agencies individually to find out if they had the capability to attack home bases of terror groups in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Narayanan asked them to raise a team, if they could ++

+Neither the heads of agencies nor the director-general of military operations went back to the NSA on this issue. Then Army chief General Deepak Kapoor also did not give much thought to the idea. In March 2010, Lt Gen R.K. Loomba, then director-general of Military Intelligence+

++ approached the new chief, General V.K. Singh, saying that he could raise and train a special ops team. Singh gave his go-ahead.

Loomba then handpicked one of his finest spies, Colonel Baks to raise and train the unit. ++

++ Bakshi’s first pick was Lt Col B. aka Birdie, who had served in the Research and Analysis Wing. He was awarded a gallantry award for his role in a classified operation. He was Bakshi’s point man against terrorist groups in the northeast and Jammu and Kashmir.++

++ Lt Col D. was the second man to be picked. The veteran skydiver with 3,000 jumps under his belt commanded an Army company during the Kargil war. Later, he was part of a special action group of the National Security Guard. During a counter-terrorist operation in Sopore++

++ Jammu and Kashmir, Sarvesh sensed that his men were in danger and barged into a house where Afghan terrorists were holed up. He killed them all and saved his men. No 3 was Lt Col Alfa a seasoned negotiator. While serving with Assam Rifles, he created assets in the dreaded++

++ United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). These assets were later used to persuade the ULFA leadership to come to a truce with the Army, which ensured peace in Assam for quite a while. Lt Col Z was the fourth. Known for his wide network among terror groups in the northeast ++

Z had brought about the cease-fire deal with the Dima Halim Daogah ultras of Assam. He had played a key role in the arrest of some DHD leaders. Zgathered crucial intelligence on arms trafficking into India from Myanmar and helped intercept consignments. ++

++ Bakshi’s best pick, perhaps, was Lt Col Naughty. Diabetic and overweight, he looked quite unlike an Army spy. A training injury meant that he could not work out and, thus, he gained weight. Many laughed when Bakshi picked him. But, they soon found that he could walk++

++ for miles through the hilly Jammu and Kashmir terrain with a walking stick for support. A master in cultivating assets among the terrorist groups, he was the one who helped the Army identify the real troublemakers during the stone-pelting protests in the summer of 2010.++

++ The going was good for a short while. The team was following the likes of Syed Salahuddin, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen chief, in occupied Kashmir. A board of officers’ report confirmed this and the Army had forwarded the report to the defence ministry ++

++ The report also mentioned other operations done by the team, including ones in the northeast and in Pakistan. Especially highlighted was one in an Inter-Services Intelligence office in Faisalabad, Pakistan.++

“The unit was working very efficiently. It was an asset for the Army and the country,” said Loomba, about the TSD. While the group was establishing contacts and assets in occupied Kashmir, the weather was getting rough in the Army HQ. General V.K. Singh and the defence ministry++

++ were slugging it out over his age. A.K. Antony was defence minister. It was perceived that Singh wanted to scuttle the chances of General Bikram Singh The ministry started questioning V.K. Singh’s initiatives, and top among them was the TSD ++

++ Singh’s detractors alleged that TSD was snooping on Antony and defence ministry officials. Though it would have been very difficult to track Antony’s number using off-the-air interceptors. Moreover, all classified communication goes through encrypted lines and not through++

regular service providers or devices. As soon as he took over as Army chief, Gen Bikram Singh ordered a probe into the activities of the TSD. He suspended its operations and "virtually" disbanded it. The Army HQ also wanted an inquiry into the TSD by the CBI ++

++ Antony rejected the demand fearing that this would affect India’s relations with countries where TSD operatives had been active. Once Bikram Singh pulled the plug on the TSD, it was a free for all. ++

++TSD faced allegations ranging from misuse of secret funds, using off-the-air interceptors to tap phones of Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials, attempt to topple Jammu and Kashmir government, and change the line of succession in the Indian Army.++

++ The cases against TSD began after a Havildar from the outfit was “allegedly” intercepted with classified information by the Department of Revenue Intelligence in Kerala during May 2012. ++

But the manner in which the UPA II government orchestrated the sordid affair of shutting down TSD — which was giving ISI sleepless nights — and moulded perceptions through disinformation would put even the capabilities of Cambridge Analytica to shame.++

++ The 'mobile interceptors', around which the whole story was cooked, were neither procured nor held by the TSD. These were imported by the director general of Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) which functioned directly under Defence Minister AK Anthony and had nothing to do ++

++ with the Indian Army or the army chief. If mobile interceptors were deployed in Delhi in 2012, it would be on orders of Anthony, then prime minister Manmohan Singh and Congress president Sonia Gandhi. The story of bugging Anthony’s office was cooked up to give credence to the+

‘mobile interceptors’ narrative. The same director general of DIA offered bribes of Rs 14 cr to General VK Singh in the latter’s office to push a defence deal, and when jailed later, a prominent lawyer from the ruling party went rushing to get him bail. ++

++ The UPA II wanted to place this director general of DIA as director general of National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) but called it off after the mobile interceptors scandal emerged in the media++

++ The worst part was leaking classified military intelligence to the media by the Ministry of Defence, which again could not have been without Anthony’s indulgence. Whether the higher-ups were under ISI blackmail due to the hawala transactions or ++

++ feared exposure to the narcotics mafia, the entire episode amounted to high treason involving the highest level political dispensation of that time. Significantly, several Indian politicians are known to be in the net of Dawood. ++

It is obvious that the UPA II used the army hierarchy to shut down the TSD but posts in media question why some senior officers became a party to political maneuvering despite adverse impact on army capability and national security.++

++The 1993 Vohra Committee Report pointed to mafia virtually running a parallel government: money power used to develop a network of muscle-power, also used by the politicians during elections; rapid spread and growth of criminal gangs, armed senas, drug mafias, smuggling gangs+

++ drug peddlers and economic lobbies, having developed extensive network of contacts with bureaucrats/government functionaries at local levels, politicians, media persons and strategically located individuals in non-State sector++

++ some having international linkages and foreign intelligence; various mafias operating with impunity due links with governmental functionaries, political leaders, and others; any leakage of linkages of this crime syndicate with senior government functionaries or political ++

++ leaders in the states or at the Centre could have a destabilising effect on the functioning of government.The above mafia is what some refer to as ‘Hamam’. Having infiltrated all institutions in the country, the ‘Hamam’ found a simple solution to make the military ++

++ to fall in line. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) was ordered to initiate annual confidential reports (ACRs) on senior officers that went directly to the party high command. Those with whatever misdemeanors were tagged for future placements (and blackmail if needed), ++

++ not that only they were promoted. But these ACRs certainly helped crucial placement at crucial times in all three Services. There is jubilation about charges being dropped against Colonel Baks some even attributing the movie Aiyaari ++

++ replicating the affair in an outstanding manner to the public at large. But the real reason is that GCM was impossible without letting Colonel Bakshi cross-examine the witnesses, which would have brought scores of skeletons tumbling out. +

++ For the same reason, he was also not provided with copies of documents used against him, not even a copy of the board of officers implicating him — which he is authorised by law.

Finally The TSD ( I do have Original Pic )

My salutes to you and sorry