Latest issue of IS newsletter "al-Naba" includes the second installment in series of articles narrating how the group withstood "the infidels' war on the Islamic State."
The title this time: "Breaking the Siege on the Islamic State of Iraq." https://jihadology.net/2020/05/21/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-newsletter-al-naba-235/
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The title this time: "Breaking the Siege on the Islamic State of Iraq." https://jihadology.net/2020/05/21/new-issue-of-the-islamic-states-newsletter-al-naba-235/
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This edition highlights the importance of Syria's war in reviving IS (then ISI) in Iraq after 2010, as it foiled a "Crusader" plot to suppress the group made of two parts:
1. Continuing pressure by ISI's enemies inside Iraq.
2. A "siege" on IS by neighboring countries.
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1. Continuing pressure by ISI's enemies inside Iraq.
2. A "siege" on IS by neighboring countries.
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In IS's telling, pressure on it inside Iraq relaxed when Iraq's factions turned on each other.
Syria's war, meanwhile, broke the "siege" – it was a "window from which the jihad in Iraq could breathe," as Syria's state contracted and IS reactivated networks (translation
).
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Syria's war, meanwhile, broke the "siege" – it was a "window from which the jihad in Iraq could breathe," as Syria's state contracted and IS reactivated networks (translation

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This is why I argued for @CrisisGroup that 2014 is unlikely to repeat – things had gone wrong inside *and* outside Iraq in ways that supercharged IS: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/when-measuring-isiss-resurgence-use-right-standard
IS may be getting worse in Iraq – but we need to measure that by a more real standard, not 2013-14.
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IS may be getting worse in Iraq – but we need to measure that by a more real standard, not 2013-14.
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