Pakistani nuclear forces

Pakistan continues to expand its nuclear arsenal with more warheads, more delivery systems, and a growing fissile materials production industry. Analysis of a large number of commercial satellite images of Pakistani Army ++
++ garrisons and air force bases shows what appear to be mobile launchers and underground facilities that might be related to nuclear forces. ++
++ Some estimate that Pakistan now has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 140 to 150 warheads. This stockpile exceeds the projection made by the US Defense Intelligence Agency in 1999 that Pakistan would have 60 to 80 warheads by 2020++
( Source
US Defense Intelligence Agency. 1999. The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020, A Primer on the Future Threat, in Scarborough R (2004) Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander, 194–223. Washington, DC: Regnery.) ++
++ With several delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and its uranium enrich- ment facilities expanding, however, Pakistan has a stock- pile that will likely increase further over the next 10 years. ++
++ The size of the increase will depend on many factors. Two key factors will be how many nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. Speculation that Pakistan may become the world’s third-largest nuclear weapon state ++
– with a stockpile of some 350 warheads a decade from now – are, as believed, exaggerated, not least because that would require a buildup two to three times faster than the growth rate over the past two decades. ++
++ It is estimated that the country’s stockpile could more realistically grow to 220 to 250 warheads by 2025, if the current trend continues. If that happens, it would make Pakistan the world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapon state.
++ But unless India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will not continue to grow indefinitely but might begin to level off as its current weapons programs are completed. ++
++ Nuclear policy developments
Pakistan is modifying its nuclear posture with new short-range nuclear-capable weapon systems to coun- ter military threats below the strategic level. The efforts seek to create a full-spectrum deterrent that is designed not only to respond ++
to nuclear attacks, but also to counter an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani territory. This development has created considerable concern in other countries, including the US, which fears that it lowers the threshold for nuclear use in a military conflict with India.++
++ In the Worldwide Threat Assessment for 2018, US Director of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats said, “Pakistan continues to produce nuclear weapons and develop new types of nuclear weapons, including short- range tactical weapons, sea-based cruise missiles, ++
++ air- launched cruise missiles, and longer-range ballistic missiles. These new types of nuclear weapons will introduce new risks for escalation dynamics and security in the region”

( This report has omitted India as threat to US and has said money other things on PaK)
++ Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which includes all government agencies involved in the nuclear mission, held its 23rd meeting on 21 December 2017, under the chairmanship of then- Prime Minister. The group reviewed a study of “certain destabilizing actions”++
++ occurring in the region around Pakistan, including “the massive arms build-up in the conventional domain, nuclearization of the Indian Ocean Region and plans for development/deployment of [ballistic missile defense].” ++
At the 2017 meeting, according to Inter Services Public Relations press release, the command authority “reiterated Pakistan’s policy of developing and maintaining Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and avoidance of arms race,” ++
++ while expressing confidence in the country’s “capability to address any form of aggression” The National Command Authority also reviewed the “Nuclear Security Regime” of the nuclear arsenal and expressed “full confidence” in both Pakistan’s command and control systems++
++ and existing security measures meant to “ensure comprehensive stewardship and security of stra- tegic assets and materials.” It lauded the nuclear arsenal’s “high standards of training and operational readiness.” The National Command Authority’s latest statement on security
++ and safety was, in part, a response to interna- tional concern that Pakistan’s evolving arsenal – particu- larly its growing inventory of short-range nuclear weapon systems – could lead to problems with warhead manage- ment and command and control during a crisis. ++
++ Satellite images show that security perimeters around many bases and military facilities have been upgraded over the past seven years in response to terrorist attacks. Over the past decade, the US assessment of nuclear weapons security in Pakistan appears to have changed ++
considerably from confidence to concern, particularly as a result of the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. In 2007, a US State Department official told Congress that++
++ , “We’re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise” Wait Hold On ++
++ In stark contrast, the recent assessment in 2018 was: “We are particularly concerned by the development of tactical nuclear weapons that are designed for use in battlefield. We believe that these systems are more susceptible to terrorist theft and ++
increase the likelihood of nuclear exchange" Upon unveiling his South Asia strategy on 21 August 2017, Trump urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, and noted the need to “prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists” ++ TBC ++
In 2016, US Undersecretary of State Rose Gottemoeller told members of the US Congress, “Reinstate full original statement: “Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you're taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, ++
++ as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure” Samar Mubarik Mund, the former director of the country’s National Defense Complex, explained in 2013 that a Pakistani nuclear warhead is “assembled only at the eleventh hour if [it] needs to be launched.++
++ It is stored in three to four different parts at three to four different locations. If a nuclear weapon doesn’t need to be launched, then it is never available in assembled form” ( Source World Bulletin. 2013. “Pakistan Refutes Saudi Funding, Weapons Claims.” November 9.) ++
++ In 2015, General Khalid Kidwai, a member of Pakistan’s National Command Authority, explained: “Pakistan opted to develop a variety of short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons, also dubbed tactical nuclear weapons,” as a “defensive, deterrence response to an offensive doctrine”++
++ Kidwai said the NASR short-range weapon specifically “was born out of a compulsion of this thing that I men- tioned about some people on the other side toying with the idea of finding space for conventional war, despite Pakistan nuclear weapons. ++
++Delhi envisioned launching quick strikes into Pakistan within two to four days with eight to nine brigades simultaneously. Such an attack force might involve roughly 32,000– 36,000 troops. He expressed his fear and understanding of India's policy. ++
++ The New York Times reported that although an unknown number of the tactical weapons had been built, they had not yet been deployed with warheads in the field ( In September 2016, in an interview on Geo News, Pakistani defense minister Khawaja M. Asif++
said, “We are always pressurised [sic] time and again that our tactical (nuclear) weapons, in which we have a super- iority, that we have more tactical weapons than we need. It is internationally recognized that we have a superiority and if there is a threat to our security ++
or if anyone steps on our soil and if someone’s designs are a threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those weapons for our defense” ++TBC ++
Nuclear weapons production complex
Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile mate- rial production complex that is expanding. It includes the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant east of Islamabad, which appears to be growing with the addition ++
of what could be another enrichment plant, as well as the enrichment plant at Gadwal to the north of Islamabad ( Source Want more locations ++
++ Four heavy-water plutonium production reactors appear to have been completed at what is normally referred to as the Khushab Complex some 33 kilometers south of Khushab in Punjab province. Three of the reactors at the complex have been added in the past 10 years.++
The addition of a publicly confirmed thermal power plant at Khushab provides new information for estimating the power of the four reactors ++ ( Again The New Labs Reprocessing Plant at Nilore, east of Islamabad, ++
++ which reprocesses spent fuel and extracts plutonium, has been expanded. Meanwhile, a second reprocessing plant located at Chashma in the northwestern part of Punjab province may have been completed. ( ++
++ Nuclear-capable missiles and their mobile launchers are developed and produced at the National Defence Complex (sometimes called the National Development Complex) in the Kala Chitta Dahr mountain range west of Islamabad. ++
The complex is divided into two sections. The western section south of Attock appears to be involved in development, production, and test- launching of missiles and rocket engines. The eastern section north of Fateh Jang is involved in production and assembly of +
road-mobile Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs), which are designed to transport and fire missiles. Satellite images show the presence of launchers for Shaheen I and Shaheen II ballistic missiles and Babur cruise missiles. ++
++ The Fateh Jang section has been expanded significantly over the past 10 years, with several large launcher assembly buildings. Other launcher and missile-related production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila.++
++ Little is publicly known about warhead production, but experts have suspected for many years that the Pakistan Ordnance Factories near Wah, northwest of Islamabad, serve a role. One of the Wah factories is located near a unique facility with six earth-covered bunkers (igloos)+
inside a multi-layered safety perimeter with armed guards. The security perimeter was expanded significantly between 2005 and 2010, possibly in response to terrorist attacks against other military facilities. Estimating the size of the Pakistani nuclear warhead ++
stockpile is fraught with uncertainty. A frequent mis- take is to derive the estimate directly from the amount of weapon-grade fissile material produced. As of the end of 2016, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that ++
++ Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 3,400 kilograms (kg) of weapon-grade (90 percent enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU), and about 280 kg of weapon-grade plutonium. This material is theoretically enough to produce between 236 and 283 warheads, ++
++ assuming that each first-generation implosion-type warhead’s solid core uses either 15 to 18 kg of weapon-grade HEU or 5 to 6 kg of plutonium. However, calculating stockpile size based solely on fissile material inventory is an incomplete methodology that tends to produce ++
inflated numbers. Instead, war-head estimates must take several factors into account, including the amount of weapon-grade fissile material produced, warhead design choice and proficiency, war- head production rates, numbers of operational nuclear- capable launchers, ++
how many of those launchers are dual-capable, nuclear strategy, and statements by government officials. Like other nuclear weapon states, Pakistan probably maintains a reserve. Moreover, Pakistan simply lacks enough nuclear-capable launchers to accommodate 200 to 300 warheads; ++
Like other nuclear weapon states, Pakistan probably maintains a reserve. Moreover, Pakistan simply lacks enough nuclear-capable launchers to accommodate 200 to 300 warheads; furthermore, all of Pakistan’s launchers are thought to be dual-capable, which means that some of them++
espe- cially the shorter-range systems, presumably are assigned to non-nuclear missions as well.The amount of fissile material in warheads can be reduced, and their yield increased, by using tritium to “boost” the fission process. But Pakistan’s tritium production capability++
++ is poorly understood. A German company allegedly provided Pakistan with a small amount of tritium and some tritium-processing technology in the late 1980s and China allegedly shipped some tritium directly to Pakistan. ++
++ (Source Kalinowski, M. B., and L. C. Colschen. 1995. “International Control of Tritium to Prevent Horizontal Proliferation and to Foster Nuclear Disarmament.” Science and Global Security 5: 147. doi:10.1080/08929889508426422. )++
++ The Khushab complex for years has been rumored to produce tritium,4 and the PINSTECH complex near Nilore may do so as well . However, one rumored tritium extraction plant at Khushab turned out to be a coal-fired power plant ( Source
++Pakistan claimed that all its nuclear tests in 1998 were tritium-boosted HEU designs, but the yields detected by seismic signals were not sufficient to substantiate such a capability.++
++ Kidwai acknowledged in March 2015 that Pakistan “possesses a variety of nuclear weapons, in different categories. At the strategic level, at the operational level, and the tactical level”. In December 2017 he provided more details, saying Pakistan’s nuclear strategy ++
++ required the “full spectrum of nuclear weapons in all three categories – strategic, operational and tactical, with full range coverage of the large Indian land mass and its outlying territories.” ++TBC++
It is estimated that Pakistan currently is producing sufficient fissile material to build 14 to 27 new war- heads per year, although DIA estimates that the actual warhead increase in the stockpile is probably around 10 warheads per year.++
++ Nuclear Capable Warhead.
Pakistan probably assigns a nuclear strike mission to select F-16A/B and Mirage III/V fighter squadrons. The F-16 was probably the first aircraft in the nuclear role, but the Mirage quickly joined the mission. ++
++ The F-16A/Bs were supplied by the United States between 1983 and 1987. After 40 aircraft had been delivered, the US State Department told Congress in 1989: “None of the F-16s Pakistan already owns or is about to purchase is configured for nuclear delivery” ++
++ and Pakistan “will be obligated by contract not to modify” additional F-16s “without the approval of the United States” ( Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South
Asia. . Proposed Sale of F-16s to Pakistan: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. August 2) ++
++ Yet there were multi- ple credible reports at the time that Pakistan was already modifying US-supplied F-16s for nuclear weapons, including West German intelligence officials reportedly telling Der Spiegel that Pakistan had already developed sophisticated computer ++
++ and electronic technology to outfit the US F-16s with nuclear weapons” ( Associated Press. 1989. “Pakistani Jets Said to be Nuclear- Capable.”) Delivery of addi- tional F-16s, including the more modern F-16C/D version, was delayed by concern over Pakistan’s emerging++
++ nuclear weapons program. The United States withheld delivery in the 1990s. But the policy was changed by the George W. Bush administration, which supplied Pakistan with the more modern F-16s. The F-16A/Bs are based with the 38th Wing at Mushaf (formerly Sargodha) Air Base ++
++160 kilometers (100 miles) northwest of Lahore. Organized into the 9th and 11th Squadrons (“Griffins” and “Arrows” respectively), these aircraft have a range of 1,600 km (extendable when equipped with drop tanks) and most likely are equipped to each carry a single nuclear bomb+
++Security perimeters at the base have been upgraded since 2014. Nuclear bombs are probably not stored at the base itself but could potentially be kept at the Sargodha Weapons Storage Complex 10 km to the south. In a crisis, the bombs could quickly be transferred to the base,++
or the F-16s could disperse to bases near underground storage facilities and receive the weapons there.The newest F-16C/Ds are based with the 39th Wing at Shahbaz Air Base outside Jacobabad. The wing upgraded to F-16C/Ds from Mirages in 2011++
+and so far has one squadron: the 5th Squadron (known as the “Falcons”). The base has been under significant expan- sion, with numerous weapons bunkers added since 2004. If the base has a nuclear mission, we suspect the weapons are stored elsewhere in special storage facilities.+
++ There are also F-16s visible at Minhas (Kamra) Air Base northwest of Islamabad, although that might be related to aircraft industry at the base. Some of the Mirage III and/or Mirage V aircraft apparently have been equipped for nuclear weapons and have been used in ++
++ test-launches of the nuclear- capable Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile. The Pakistani Air Force is adding aerial refueling capability to the Mirage, a capability that would greatly enhance a nuclear strike mission.++
The Mirage fighter-bombers are focused at two bases. Masroor Air Base outside Karachi houses the 32nd Wing with three Mirage squadrons: 7th Squadron (“Bandits”), 8th Squadron (“Haiders”), and 22nd Squadron (“Ghazis”).++
++ A possible nuclear weapons storage site is located five km (three miles) northwest of the base and since 2004, unique underground facilities have been constructed at Masroor that could potentially be designed to support a nuclear strike mission. ++
++ This includes a possible alert hangar with underground weapons-handling capability. The other Mirage base is Rafiqui Air base near Shorkot, which is home to the 34th Wing with two Mirage squadrons: the 15th Squadron (“Cobras”) and the 27th Squadron (“Zarras”).++
++ There are also rumors that Pakistan intends to make the Chinese-supplied JF-17 fighter nuclear-capable. According to the Pakistani Senate Defense Committee on National Defence, the pursuit of the JF-17 program was partially triggered by US military export sanctions ++
++ in response to Pakistan’s nuclear program, including the withholding of F-16 aircraft. “With spares for its top-of-the-line F16s in question, and additional F-16s removed as an option, Pakistan sought help from its Chinese ally” for the JC-17/FC-1 jet ++
++ ( Source ) A nuclear role could poten- tially involve the dual-capable Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), although plans are uncertain.

++ TBC ++
Land-based ballistic missiles
Pakistan appears to have six currently operational nuclear-capable land-based ballistic missiles: the short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4), and NASR (Hatf-9), and the med- ium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5) & Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6)+
++ Three other nuclear-capable ballistic missiles are under development: the medium-range Shaheen-1A, Shaheen-3, and the MIRVed Ababeel. The Pakistani road-mobile ballistic missile force has undergone significant development and expansion over the past decade-and-a-half. ++
++ This includes possibly eight or nine missile garrisons, including four or five along the Indian border for short-range systems (Babur, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-1, NASR) and three or four other garrisons further inland for medium-range systems (Shaheen-2 and Ghauri) ++
The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Abdali (Hatf-2) has been in development for a long time. The Pentagon reported in 1997 that the Abdali appeared to have been discontinued, but flight-testing resumed in 2002 and it was last reported test launched in 2013. ++
++ The 200-km (124-mile) missile has been dis- played at parades several times on a four-axel road- mobile Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL). The three-year gap in flight-testing indicates the Abdali program may have encountered technical difficulties.++
++ After the 2013 test, Inter Services Public Relations stated that Abdali “carries nuclear as well as conventional warheads” and “provides an operational- level capability to Pakistan’s Strategic Forces.” It said the test launch “consolidates Pakistan’s deterrence capability++
both at the operational and strategic levels” The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) was last reported test launched in 2014. Its short range of approximately 300 km (186 miles) means that the Ghaznavi cannot strike Delhi from Pakistani territory, ++
and Army units equipped with the missile are probably based relatively near the Indian border. The Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) is a single-stage, solid-fuel, dual-capable, short-range ballistic missile with a max- imum range of 750 km (466 miles) that has been in service since 2003.++
++ The Shaheen-1 is carried on a four-axle, road- mobile TEL similar to the one used for the Ghaznavi. Since 2012, Shaheen-1 test-launches have involved an extended-range version widely referred to as Shaheen- 1A. ++
The Pakistani government, which has declared the range to be 900 km (560 miles), has used both desig- nations. The Shaheen-1A was most recently reported test launched in 2015. Potential Shaheen- 1 deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil. ++
++ One of the most controversial new nuclear-capable missiles in the Pakistani arsenal is the NASR (Hatf-9), a short-range, solid-fuel missile originally with a range of only 60 km (37 miles) that has recently been extended to 70 km (43 miles) With a range too short to attack ++
++ strategic targets inside India, NASR appears intended solely for battlefield use against invading Indian troops. The four-axle, road-mobile TEL appears to use a snap-on system that can carry two or more launch-tube boxes. The system has been tested in the past using++
++ a road-mobile quadruple box launcher. The US intelligence community has listed the NASR as a deployed system since 2013 ( ) and with a total of 13 tests reported so far, the weapon system appears to be well-developed. ++
Potential deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil.
The medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6) appears to be operational after many years of development. National Defense Complex has assembled Shaheen-2 launchers since at least 2004 or 2005 +
++ and a 2017 US intelligence community report states that there are “fewer than 50” Shaheen-2 launchers deployed. (Source
++ After the November 2014 test the Pakistani govern- ment reported the range as only 1,500 km (932 miles), but the US National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) continues to set the Shaheen-2’s range at 2,000 km. The Shaheen-2 is carried on a six-axle, road-mobile TEL.++
++ Pakistan conducted two test launches of the medium- range Shaheen-3 in 2015. The Pakistani government said the missile was capable of delivering a nuclear or conven- tional warhead, and NASIC estimates a range of 2,750 km++
++ The Shaheen-3 is carried on an eight-axle TEL supplied by China and was displayed publicly for the first time at the 2015 Pakistan Day Parade. The Shaheen-3 will still require several more test-launches before it becomes operational.++
++ The range of the Shaheen-3 is sufficient to target all of mainland India from launch positions in most of Pakistan south of Islamabad. But apparently the missile was developed to do more than that. According to Gen. Kidwai, the range of 2,750 km was determined by a need to ++
++ be able to target the Nicobar and Andaman islands in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean that are “developed as strategic bases” where “India might think of putting its weapons” But for a 2,750-km range Shaheen-3 to reach the Andaman and Nicobar islands, it would need to be++
++ launched from positions in the very Eastern parts of Pakistan, close to the Indian border. If deployed in the Western parts of Balochistan province, however, the range of the Shaheen-3 would for the first time bring Israel within range of Pakistani nuclear missiles.++
++ Pakistan’s oldest nuclear-capable medium-range bal- listic missile, the road-mobile, single-stage, liquid-fuel Ghauri (Hatf-5), was test-launched on 15 April 2015.The Pakistani government announced a range of 1,300 km (807 miles), while NASIC has stated it to be 1,250 km ++
++ The extra time needed to fuel the missile before launch makes the Ghauri more vulnerable to attack than solid-fuel missiles, so it is possible that the longer-range versions of the Shaheen may eventually replace the Ghauri. ++
++ Potential deployment areas include the Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot area. On 24 January 2017, Pakistan test launched a new medium-range ballistic missile – Ababeel – that the government says is ++
++ “capable of carrying multiple war- heads, using Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology” The three-stage, solid-fuel, nuclear-capable missile, which is currently under development at the National Defense Complex, appears to be derived from the ++
++ Shaheen-3 airframe and solid-fuel motor and has a range of 2,200 km. Development of multiple-warhead capability appears to be intended as a countermeasure against India’s planned ballistic missile defense system. ++
Ground- and air-launched cruise missiles
Pakistan continues to develop versions of both the ground-launched Babur (Hatf-7) and the air- launched Ra’ad (Hatf-8) nuclear-capable cruise missiles. The country tested the Babur-2/Babur-1(B) GLCM, each stated to be an enhanced ++
++ version of the original Babur, and the Ra’ad-2 ALCM, an extended-range version of the Ra’ad. The Pakistani government says the Babur and Ra’ad systems both have stealth capabilities and pinpoint accuracy, “a low-altitude, terrain-hugging missile with high maneuverability” ++
++The Babur and Ra’ad are both much slimmer than ballistic missiles, suggesting some success with warhead miniaturization based on plu- tonium instead of uranium.The Babur is a ground-launched, subsonic, dual- capable cruise missile that looks similar to the US Tomahawk ++
++ sea-launched cruise missile, the Chinese DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile, and the Russian air-launched AS-15.The original Babur has been test-launched 11 times (last in 2014) and is prob- ably operational with the armed forces. Its road-mobile launcher appears to be ++
++ a unique five-axle TEL with a three-tube box launcher that is different than the quadruple box launcher used for static display. At different times, the Pakistani government has reported the range to be 600 km and 700 km but the US intelligence sets the range at 350 km. ++
Pakistan is developing an enhanced version of the Babur known as the Babur-2 or Babur-1(B) GLCM. The weapon has been test-launched twice: on 14 December 2016, and 14 April 2018. r 2016, and 14 April 2018 With a physical appearance and capabilities similar to those of the Babur,++
++ the Babur-2/Babur-1(B) apparently has an extended range of 700 km (435 miles), and “is capable of carrying various types of warheads” Babur TELs have been fitting out at the National Defense Complex for years and have recently been seen at the Akro garrison NE of Karachi.++
++ The garrison includes a large enclosure with six garages that have room for 12 TELs and a unique underground facility that is probably used to store the missiles. The air-launched, dual-capable Ra’ad (Hatf-8) has been test-launched six times, most recently in February 2016 ++
++ and might be entering service soon. The test-launches have been conducted from a Mirage III fighter-bomber. The Pakistani government states that the Ra’ad “can deliver nuclear and conventional warheads with great accuracy to a range of 350 km++
++ During a military parade in 2017, Pakistan displayed what was said to be Ra’ad-2 ALCM, apparently an enhanced version of the original Ra’ad. The Ra’ad-2 can reportedly reach targets at a distance of 550 km. ++
++ A potential deployment site for the Ra’ad is Masroor Air Base outside Karachi, which is home to several Mirage squadrons and includes unique underground facilities that might be associated with nuclear weapons storage and handling. ++
++ Sea-launched cruise missiles
Pakistan is also developing a sea-launched version of the Babur known as Babur-3. The weapon is still in develop- ment and has been test-launched twice: On 9 January 2017, from “an underwater, mobile platform” in the Indian Ocean , ++
and on 29 March 2018 from “an underwater dynamic platform” The Babur-3 is said to be a sea-based variant of the Babur-2 GLCM, and to have a range of 450 km. he Pakistani government says the Babur-3 is “cap- able of delivering various types of payloads and will provide Pakistan ++
++ with a Credible Second Strike Capability, augmenting deterrence. The Babur-3 will most likely be deployed on the diesel-electric Agosta class submarines . Once it becomes operational, it will provide Pakistan with a triad of nuclear strike platforms from ground, air, and sea.+
++ The Pakistani government said the Babur-3 was motivated by a need to match India’s nuclear triad and the “nuclearization of [the] Indian Ocean Region” The future submarine-based nuclear capability is managed by Headquarters Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC)++
++ The Pakistani Ministry of Defence Production in 2015 announced a contract for “the indigenous development of 1 [one] ship-borne system with 1 [one] Land Attack Missile” to be completed by October 2018.

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