China hasn’t even begun prodding the Diphu Pass (unless it has & it’s not been reported). At the Myanmar tri-junction, this area witnessed heavy fighting in 1962 & is strategically imp for a deeper & sharper offensive in eastern Arunachal & Assam. 1/6

In 2018, India increased deployments and patrolling in this area, and built a new road for better military connectivity. Myanmar, for its part, gave up its territorial claims in this sector in 1961 when it signed a boundary agreement with Beijing (smart, eh?). 2/6

The PLA has relatively easier access to this area. And if an escalation occurs here, the party that India *might* require support from will not be the Tatmadaw. It will be the Kachin Independence Army (Chaukhan Pass is south of Diphu pass, where the KIA has an outpost). 3/6

Such an eventuality will test India’s military capability in tough terrain & bring its entire ‘we focus only on Naypyidaw in Myanmar policy’ under the scanner. Let’s hope this doesn’t happen (it got v. ugly for India in ‘62 here). 4/6

But given how the situation is developing, it won’t be surprising if Beijing concentrates India’s attention in the four ‘active’ locations in Ladakh & Sikkim; & then go for a sudden move at the eastern-most (& possibly least protected) point in the boundary dispute. 5/6

To be clear, it can’t be said that the probability of this happening is high or low. But given the unpredictability and intensity of the situation at Pangong Tso, it is well worth keeping an eye on the Myanmar tri-junction. 6/6