Some thoughts on what's happening between China/India in Askai Chin...

The central development is that China is reported to have crossed into undisputed Indian territory, beyond even differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Why? I don't know, but here's some context and a best guess. 1/

Mischief always happens along the China-India border in late spring. As the snow melts, military activity resumes, and tensions increase—India's "forward policy" in 1962, the tussle over Sumdurong Chu in 1986, Doklam in 2017, etc. 2/

What makes understanding Chinese motivations even more challenging is that all most all information comes from Indian sources. Chinese activity is well covered in these reports, but Indian activity in these border areas often receives less attention. 3/

As covered elsewhere, India has been quite active lately building up infrastructure in the area. See this https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1262681615429365763.html and this https://twitter.com/nitingokhale/status/1262636065493602309?s=20, among others. On the current situation, this great post by @Nrg8000 https://twitter.com/Nrg8000/status/1264039847431254016 4/

So, Occam's razor. As @NarangVipin has suggested ( https://twitter.com/NarangVipin/status/1264208300280774656?s=20), China viewed this activity as challenging the status quo in the area and is responding. This is consistent with recent trends, as I've written about in this book chapter ( https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3546583). 5/

Moreover, China's actions today in Galwan mirror India's around Doklam in 2017, when India moved forces into disputed Chinese-Bhutanese territory in response to Chinese road-building. Doklam did not end well for India ( https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/why-india-did-not-win-the-standoff-with-china/), Galwan may not end well for China.

Added twist: COVID-19. As in the South China Sea ( https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/05/07/does-global-pandemic-open-new-south-china-sea-opportunities-beijing-not-really/), China is in no mood to show any weakness during this time.

Moreover, Chinese fears that India sought to profit from the upheaval of the disastrous Great Leap and unrest in Tibet played an important role in 1962 ( http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2008.IS.power.shifts.pdf). Hence, an even tougher response to events around Galwan. END/