So, @ajaishukla has my attention, and he should have yours, too. He makes a number of important claims in his new story on Sino-Indian border skirmishes. http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2020/05/a-new-and-worrying-chapter-ladakh.html 1/n

The first is the scale. In my mind, I think I had envisioned several company or even platoon level incidents. He says no, "more than 5,000 Chinese soldiers...have intruded into five points in Ladakh – four along the Galwan River, and one near the Pangong Lake." 2/n

The second is the specific nature of the intrusion, Shukla reports the most serious involves an incursion of "three-to-four kilometres into the Galwan Valley," because "China has violated its own claim line" in the area. 3/n

For context, one of the biggest problem areas in the run-up to the 1962 war was the fact that China altered its claim in Aksai Chin during the 1950s, leading to an understandable Indian concern that China might alter its claim again in the future. http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/1963-Chinese-Agression-in-Maps-Map-3.pdf 4/n

Further, Shukla claims that these are not just passing forces, there to yell at their Indian counterparts for trespassing on Chinese territory and perhaps unfurl a banner or two. Instead... 5/n

"This time the PLA soldiers are digging defences, preparing bunkers, moving in heavy vehicles and have reportedly even moved artillery guns to the rear..." 6/n

Nor is it merely the Chinese occupation of vacant territory. "The Pangong Lake intrusion has been especially bloody... Sources say 72 Indian soldiers were injured in the confrontation and some of them needed to be flown to hospitals in Leh, Chandi Mandir and Delhi." 7/n

I should note that we don't know who "started" physical altercations. There were many skirmishes in the run-up to the 1962 war that India appears to have initiated but led to greater Indian casualties. But PLA willingness to inflict casualties is significant. 8/n

The scope tells us something about who is in charge. The intrusions "do not appear to be a localized operation, since they are spread across the AOR of different PLA brigades & division. That suggests centralized coordination from at least the PLA’s theatre command." 9/n

Also lower-level confidence-building measures aren't working. "the PLA has stopped responding to Indian requests for flag meetings under the mutual protocol termed the “Border Management Posture” (BMP)." 10/n

Shukla also resolves a puzzle that emerged when there was a story of India doing some Sukhoi-30s flights in response to Chinese helicopter flights. I asked contemporaneously why escalate to fixed wing? 11/n https://twitter.com/clary_co/status/1260151413986004992?s=20

Well, Shukla says there already had been a bit of a rotary aircraft episode: "when two Chinese helicopter chased off an Indian helicopter in which the Leh Corps Commander was surveying Indian positions near the Pangong Lake." 12/n

All of this is worrisome. What's the good news? The comparative lack of public statements in Beijing and New Delhi--and some conciliatory ones out of New Delhi--appears to suggest leaders in both countries seek to maintain as much latitude as possible to deescalate. 13/13