I haven't managed to keep up with news well today, but I wanted to share a few quick reactions to this “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China” that was recently released as I read through it. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.20.20.pdf

As an initial reaction, I am so often struck these days by the juxtaposition of reports or articulations of American strategy that contain a clear logic and relative coherence, relative to the chaos of U.S. politics and policy in the current environment. This is no exception.

There are elements of this report and of U.S. China policy under the current administration that I can agree with up to a point. But personally, I start from the point of view American competitiveness must start at home, with the vitality and strength of our democracy.

When our values and institutions are threatened or compromised, day by day, in ways that are all but unprecedented, calls for a "strategic approach" and "principled realism" for "long-term strategic competition" tend to ring very hollow to my ears.

In retrospect, the premise and initial argument of this report are borne out by recent events and the trajectory of the PRC in Xi's 'new era.' To the extent engagement was premised on the expectation of transformation, the CCP has long seen elements of U.S. policy as threatening.

As per recent debates, CCP intentions and aspirations, including with regard to global governance, can come across quite clearly in plans and policies, or speeches and statements, yet remain constrained by missteps and persistent limitations in capacity.

As a general observation, in this report and the latest U.S. strategies, a critical question unresolved is how to conceptualize what constitute "vital national interests" of the United States beyond the usual platitudes especially under current conditions in a 'post-COVID' world.

That is, "competition" to what end? When considering how to "protect the American people, homeland, and way of life," China is a challenge, but hardly the greatest or most urgent threat, as recent events have painfully highlighted.

It is so much easier to identify an "adversary" than to reckon with systemic failings, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities within the United States. A "competitive approach" on the world stage cannot succeed without fixing what's broken at home.

For instance, this is insane and the wrong lesson entirely from the Cold War. We are much more likely to spend *ourselves* into oblivion on our current trajectory. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-armscontrol/u-s-prepared-to-spend-russia-china-into-oblivion-to-win-nuclear-arms-race-u-s-envoy-idUSKBN22X2LS

Anyway, if that statement is supposedly consistent with this "strategic approach," there is clearly something rotten in our strategic thinking and/or gross inconsistency is becoming a persistent feature of U.S. policy.

Again, there are aspects of this report in its assessment and recommendations that I tend to agree with, at least in theory or as phrased, e.g., "to improve the resiliency of
our institutions, alliances, and partnerships."

"Even as we compete with the PRC, we welcome cooperation where our interests align." Yes, I'd argue competition can be constructive and productive--and is not incompatible with cooperation. But again, what matters is whether that principle is actually carried out in practice.

So too, the diagnosis of the problem at many points of the report is generally accurate, albeit phrased in a charged manner and perhaps exaggerated at some points. The threats, problems, and challenges, from IP theft to human rights abuses, are very real and have proven enduring.