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Some thoughts on the new piece by @masnick https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200518/01022544516/now-washington-post-misleadingly-complains-about-google-apple-protecting-your-privacy-too-much.shtml
on @washpost https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/15/app-apple-google-virus/
on the @apple @google #covid-19 contact tracing app: 1/12
on @washpost https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/15/app-apple-google-virus/
on the @apple @google #covid-19 contact tracing app: 1/12
I’ll begin by quoting the late, great Terry Pratchett:
“A European says: I can’t understand this, what’s wrong with me? An American says: I can’t understand this, what’s wrong with him?” 2/12
“A European says: I can’t understand this, what’s wrong with me? An American says: I can’t understand this, what’s wrong with him?” 2/12
France wants contact data from the Apple-Google app to assist public health authorities.
An American says: “Those Europeans, abandoning privacy for public surveillance! What hypocrites!”
Alternate hypothesis: There may be something here that you don’t understand. 3/12
An American says: “Those Europeans, abandoning privacy for public surveillance! What hypocrites!”
Alternate hypothesis: There may be something here that you don’t understand. 3/12
Public health authorities in the U.S. also want contact data.
An American says: “Enter the jackbooted police state.”
Alternate hypothesis:…well, Trump, so ok, but public health authorities are a different part of government, so maybe it’s…more complicated? 4/12
An American says: “Enter the jackbooted police state.”
Alternate hypothesis:…well, Trump, so ok, but public health authorities are a different part of government, so maybe it’s…more complicated? 4/12
Misunderstanding #1: “Privacy” doesn’t reduce to opting in to data reporting. It depends on details of design and information flow. To be fair, the app has some privacy protective elements (randomly rotating identifiers, no central storage). But it doesn’t matter because…5/12
Misunderstanding #2: Public health surveillance authority is a longstanding, globally acknowledged *exception* to the ordinary operation of privacy/data protection laws. And it *never* depends on voluntary self-reporting of contacts by a subset of the population.6/12
Oh yeah and also because of poor overlap between those who own smartphones and those at highest risk (low-income and poor individuals, including many “essential workers”), which defeats the purpose of public health surveillance. https://www.lawfareblog.com/importance-equity-contact-tracing 7/12
Public health surveillance works when (1) universal, (2) mandatory, (3) not needing jackbooted enforcement because it’s (4) backstopped by trust in institutions that (5) haven’t been hollowed out by decades of neglect and are (6) insulated from political interference. 8/12
Privacy protection in public health surveillance comes from…wait for it…conceptions of minimization and purpose limitation that are so familiar within European systems that they don’t need to be explained.9/12
Which is why France didn’t need to explain its legal system to big tech (or a bunch of Americans who can’t get their own house in order). And why @HNissenbaum prefers a system of public health authority constrained by law to a system of big tech noblesse oblige.10/12
To be fair, pandemic response in the U.S. right now is compromised by rampant disinformation, systematic underfunding of public health agencies, and blatant interference for private political gain. But big tech hasn’t earned the public’s trust either.11/12
The Apple-Google approach to #covid-19 continues the sorry tradition of replacing core government functions with feeble privatized simulacra. It doesn’t involve public health authorities as essential partners; it sidelines them. 12/12
