1. The Lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (Afghanistan) released its quarterly report today.

The "Taliban ramped up attacks against" Afghan security forces "almost immediately after signing" the Feb. 29 agreement in Doha. https://www.dodig.mil/Reports/Lead-Inspector-General-Reports/Article/2191020/lead-inspector-general-for-operation-freedoms-sentinel-i-quarterly-report-to-th/

2. This is why it is a withdrawal agreement between the U.S. and Taliban - not a peace accord. The Taliban "limited violence against coalition forces" -- happy to watch withdrawal -- "but increased attacks against the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)."

3. The State Department failed to get the Taliban to publicly renounce al-Qaeda. The Taliban's "leadership has been reluctant to publicly break with al Qaeda." That's telling.

If there's nothing to Taliban-AQ, as some claim, then why doesn't the Taliban announce a real "break"?

4. As the Taliban is unwilling to publicly break with AQ, the State Department says "implementation of the U.S.-Taliban agreement will require extensive long-term monitoring."

But the deal calls for a complete U.S. withdrawal by 2021, making any long-term monitoring dubious.

5. While Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which is openly loyal to Ayman al-Zawahiri & Taliban emir Haibatullah Akhundzada, was reportedly "concerned" about the talks, it "continued to maintain a close relationship with the Taliban." So, no break.

6. The Inspector General also cites this analysis I did of al-Qaeda's endorsement of the Taliban-U.S. withdrawal deal. Al-Qaeda's senior leadership said the deal was a "great victory" for the Taliban and encouraged all jihadists to abide by it.
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/03/al-qaeda-lauds-talibans-great-victory-over-america-and-allies.php

7. As we've reported, there's nothing in the text of the agreement that was released about verification or enforcement mechanisms. The State Department claims such a mechanism was established, but the details "are classified." Congress should be skeptical & ask for clarification.

8. Some dodgy classified enforcement mechanism shouldn't be an acceptable alternative to a clear, public Taliban renunciation of al-Qaeda. If the Taliban really turned on AQ, it'd be easy to document and show -- no need for classification.