I think I'm basically sympathetic to process ontology, especially in biological contexts, but I rarely find myself convinced by attempts to argue that particular results best fit a process ontological interpretation over a substance ontological interpretation. 1/4

The arguments so often seem to just involve using the word "process" in the description of one model, and not using it in the description of another model, even though it could equally be applied or withheld in either case—the models are just describing different processes. 2/4

Or, when a disfavored view involves discrete stages as an aspect of its analytic methods, reifying those stages into its fundamental ontology, but, when a favored view involves discrete stages as an aspect of its analytic methods, not reifying those stages in the same way. 3/4

Just be a process ontologist because you've read Nāgārjuna; it'll save you a lot of effort trying to argue that different biological theories have fundamentally different views on what change is. 4/4