Things @thejointstaff should have known before embarking on #PME reform (1/3):

* avg war college/ILE graduating class gpa since Goldwater-Nichols
* # of failed/dropped students
* avg undergrad gpa of all students since G-N
* sources of undergrad degrees of all students since G-N

(2/3)

* undergrad majors of all students since G-N
* % of grads who go to COCOM/JS billets
* avg # years between PME graduation and COCOM/JS billet
* undergrad school, major, gpa, war college standing of those who go to COCOM/JS billets

(3/3)

After all, among the best practices we try to teach #PME students is gathering data before jumping to conclusions (and not framing their research question in terms of "proving" what they already believe to be true).

(+1) The entire premise of the Dunford-Mattis "stagnation" critique was: we had this one staff officer who'd graduated PME and couldn't do what we wanted them to do, so obviously it was PME's fault because it should have taught them to do what we wanted them to do.

(+2) Now if we want to be all hoity-toity "academic" about it:
H0: No correlation between PME curricula & an officer's performance
H1: If an officer in a JS billet fails, it's because PME failed to teach them
H2: If an officer in a JS billet fails, it's because of the officer

The Dunford-Mattis critique & new JCS "vision" are both premised on Hypothesis 1, but neither actually *tests* the hypothesis (least of all against the null H0). Instead, both are tautologies that simply restate the original hypothesis as conclusion, thus

H1 ∴ PME stagnant, QED

@threadreaderapp unroll