I see that @FredFleitz has joined the debate over "unmasking" and claims NSA should have refused the requests for the "unmasking" of Flynn by Obama Administration officials. First, Fleitz's references to his own experience add nothing to the debate. 1/

As others have noted, the vast bulk of unmasking requests to NSA relate to NSA's reporting derived from Section 702 collection. Section 702 was first added to FISA in 2008, years after Fleitz's time in the State Department and at CIA. 2/

Moreover, the reporting requirements related to "unmasking" are found in Section 702, did not exist in FISA prior to the enactment of Section 702, and are not required as part of the reporting on FISA Title I activities. 3/

So, there is no reason Fleitz would necessarily have been exposed to any "unmasking" issues during his time at CIA or the State Dept. Indeed, it's hard to say whether Fleitz ever occupied any position at CIA where "unmasking" decisions would have been within his purview. 4/

Fleitz apparently has no familiarity with what NSA's Section 702 Minimization Procedures say about "unmasking." Generally, those procedures permit removing the generic identifier in an intelligence report and providing an authorized dissemination of the identity of a US Person 5/

upon receipt of a request by an authorized requestor that meets NSA minimization requirements and is approved by one of a very limited number of NSA officials. A basic minimization principle permits "unmasking" where the information "is necessary to understand the foreign 6/

intelligence information or assess its importance." (Interestingly, the Minimization Procedures also permit the dissemination of US Person identities, upon an approved request, where, e.g., (1) the information indicates the US Person may be an agent of a foreign power, or 7/

(2) the information indicates that the US Person may be the target of intelligence activities of a foreign power, or (3) the information indicates that the US Person is engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, or 8/

(4) the information is reasonably believed to be evidence of a crime that has been, is being, or is about to be committed.) "Unmasking" requests are regularly reviewed at NSA, and by DoJ NSD and the ODNI. That said, they are not necessarily rare in sheer numbers: 9/

the DNI Statistical Transparency Reports released annually show that NSA "unmasked" over 10000 US Person identifiers in response to requests received in CY 2019, and issued over 16000 "unmaskings" in response to such requests in CY 2018. Still, there is one point on which 10/

I agree with Fleitz: "[Unmasking is treated very seriously. It's not that easy to do it. It's not routine." The NSA Minimization Procedures pursuant to which these disseminations are made are specifically approved by the FISA Court in connection with each Section 702 11/

certification presented to the court. Moreover, FISA requires that those minimization procedures meet the statutory definition of "Minimization procedures" in §101(h) of FISA, and that the FISA court find those procedures to be "consistent with the fourth amendment to the 12/

Constitution." Public information related to "unmaskings" has been provided in the annual DNI Statistical Transparency Reports since such disclosures were recommended by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board's extensive review of the Section 702 Program in 2014. 13/

NSA's function is to provide policymakers with foreign intelligence information needed for those policymakers to conduct US national security and foreign policy. It is not a function of NSA to second guess or overrule requests for US Person identities that are submitted /14

by approved requestors and meet the requirements of NSA's FISA court-approved Minimization Procedures. I can only imagine how Fleitz and others of his ilk would react if NSA suddenly started refusing to comply with "unmasking" requests originated from officials in the current /15

administration. Finally, it may be true that, depending on the circumstances, an "unmasking" request may not be classified, although that decision should be made by an appropriate classification official examining all the surrounding circumstances. /16

However, if Fleitz believes that there is no reason to classify the response to an "unmasking" request, he is simply wrong. If you don't think that the public revelation of "unmasking" requests and NSA's responses to those requests /17

(information like that foolishly declassified by Acting DNI Grenell) doesn't send foreign adversaries scurrying to review their own communications records to see who was talking with whom on what circuit at those particular times, /18

then he needs to go back to the Farm (Camp Peary) and brush up on his tradecraft. Sorry, for the length of this thread but there is way too much disinformation being peddled on this "unmasking" subject. /19