Col. Emory Upton’s attack on the Mule Shoe Salient at Spotsylvania on May 10,1864 was a close-run thing. The attack itself, a result of careful preparation by the youthful and talented brigade commmander, came tantalizingly close to effecting a permanent breach of Lee’s line.

If successful, the attack would exploit terrain advantages that would give US forces a splendid artillery platform that would command the enemy’s lines, making their position along that line untenable for further resistance.

Grant sought to exploit the shift of Jubal Early’s veterans to the left of Lee’s line to meet the threat posed by W. S. Hancock’s II Corps at the Po River. Grant therefore decided to assault the center of Lee’s line with his V & VI Corps, under Hancock’s overall command.

Attacking the western face of the Mule Shoe would be a brigade from Horatio Wright’s VI Corps commanded by Upton, totaling 12 regiments.

Upton assembled his regimental commanders to examine the enemy’s line and explain his plan of assault and their roles in it.

Upton’s brigade would jump off 200 yards from the enemy’s line, across open ground, under the aimed fire of George Doles’ Georgians.

Attacking in column of regiments, with muskets uncapped, Upton urged speed on his regimental commanders.

Upton had taken care to reconnoiter the sector of the salient assigned to him, and was careful that his regimental commanders were aware of their individual responsibilities for exploiting a breach in Doles’ defenses.

Although Upton’s attack was successful (though costly), the supporting assault by Mott’s division of II Corps, intended to exploit Upton’s success, was weakly executed, thus allowing the Rebels time to bring up reinforcements and drive off Upton’s thus far victorious troops.

Upton’s success would inspire Grant to undertake another, larger assault on 12 May, focused on the Mule Shoe Salient, that would ultimately fail with great loss of life.

Put simply, Grant and his subordinates had taken the wrong lessons from Upton’s near success.

In the words of one student of the battle, “Upton had gone through careful planning with his regimental commanders, made a leaders’ reconnaissance, and then followed through with with speed and surprise in his execution.”

Choosing to attack in column of regiments “had given his force a narrow front when crossing the 200-yard open field, and Upton’s orders not to shoot and keep moving minimized the time his soldiers were exposed to converging Confederate fire before they closed with the enemy..

..and massed their superior numbers at the penetration point.” These lessons were not disseminated throughout the army, and contributed, along with the rain, mud, poor intelligence, and stubborn enemy resistance to frustrate Grant’s efforts at carrying the salient.

For his part in the attack of May 10 Upton would be promoted to brigadier general. He would continue in command of his brigade until he assumed command of the 1st Division, VI Corps at the Third Battle of Winchester in September.