Unsurprising that this administration believes it can argue that the US is still an #IranDeal participant & thus take advantage of the UNSCR 2231 provision that snapsback sanctions on Iran - despite saying on multiple occasions that the US is no longer a JCPOA participant. 1/ https://twitter.com/SangerNYT/status/1254532939964088331
The mixed messaging on Iran and selective interpretation of UNSCR 2231 is par for the course from this administration, but it continues to erode US credibility, disregard the security interests of key U.S. allies and partners, & risks escalating a crisis with Iran 5/
If the US succeeds in making the absurd argument that is still a participant - after repeatedly saying the US is not - and snaps back sanctions on Iran, it will very likely collapse the JCPOA. And worse, could lead Iran to follow through on treats to withdraw from the NPT. 6/
Iran has stated that it would withdraw from the NPT (meaning no required IAEA monitoring and no nuclear limits) if there’s an attempt to snapback UN sanctions. Whether Iran would follow through on this threat remains unclear - it would have significant consequences. 7/
Even if Iran does not withdraw from the NPT, UN snapback would very likely collapse the JCPOA, meaning less monitoring and fewer restrictions. Iran is violating most JCPOA limits now, but its actions are reversible and Tehran maintains that it wants to return to the JCPOA. 8/
UN sanctions snapback likely closes the door to returning Iran (and ideally the US) to full compliance with the deal down the road. It risks igniting a new nuclear crisis. 9/
Only this time - unlike the lead up to the multilateral JCPOA negotiations - the US will have less credibility and less international support for sanctions. This isn’t a formula for a ‘better deal.’ 10/
Yes, the expiration of the arms embargo will having troubling consequences. But extending the embargo is not the only option. There are other steps that the United States can take to mitigate those adverse impacts. 11/
And there are other UN sanctions that constrain Iran’s options for arms sales to certain groups and there are US sanctions on Iran’s arms trade that were not impacted by the JCPOA. 12/

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf
It is also worth remembering why the arms embargo was imposed it the first place - these provisions were included in UNSCRs to pressure Iran to negotiate over its nuclear program. 13/
These are nuclear related sanctions. Susan Rice originally emphasized in 2010, when the arms embargo was expanded as part of Resolution 1929, that the sanctions would be suspended if a nuclear deal was reached. 14/
Changing the goal posts for sanctions relief makes future negotiations-on Iran’s nuclear program and other areas of U.S. concern - much more difficult. 15/
A more effective approach would be a US & Iranian return to the JCPOA & then using that as a basis for broader negotiations that build on the nuclear deal and address other issues of concern, including destabilizing arms transfers to states in the Middle East region. 16/16
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