THREAD: I wanted to share a thought about the comparative optics of America and China's respective responses to COVID-19, beginning with two caveats.

First, albeit for different reasons, neither country has acquitted itself well thus far.

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Second, it's likely too soon to assess how this crisis will shape the long-term strategic balance between the two countries; we're only four months into a pandemic whose human toll and economic costs may well continue to grow rapidly until a vaccine is widely available.

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The above being said, though, the relative damage to America's reputation has arguably been greater because it has failed to fulfill the expectations that most observers have of the world's lone superpower—expectations that they may not have of its putative replacement.

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Most wouldn't have expected the country that accounts for one-fourth of the global economy and is capable of projecting military power across the world to run out of personal protective equipment for its doctors and nurses so quickly after the virus broached its borders.

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Nor would most have expected the country that has so often mobilized collective action to address global crises over the past three-quarters of a century to be as inward-looking and as at loggerheads with its longstanding allies.

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The headline of @kbennhold's powerful article this week—"'Sadness' and Disbelief From a World Missing American Leadership"—reflects a widespread belief that the United States should and/or an underlying hope that it will provide that leadership.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/world/europe/coronavirus-american-exceptionalism.html

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It's difficult to imagine that one would read a comparable headline about China: while other countries will, of course, welcome assistance that it provides as the world struggles to overcome the pandemic, few expect it to lead that response.

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I'm reminded of this paragraph from an article that @Malinowski wrote in March 2017, shortly after the end of his tenure as assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor.

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/trump-human-rights-freedom-state-department/520677/

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In sum, fairly or not, many observers are likely to assess America's domestic response more harshly than China's because of its singular economic capacity; and its international response more harshly because of its record of mobilizing collective action.

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I tried to make a point along these lines in a piece for @voxdotcom a few years ago, at a time when many observers were lamenting U.S. "weakness" in world affairs.

https://www.vox.com/2016/7/26/12281000/us-america-weak-china-russia

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