So @wyss_m and I have been working on proxy wars for the past couple ys or so. It's a strange time to publish but still, we are thrilled about our article on non-state sponsorship in the current issue of @Journal_IS. For some bckgrd + thoughts on it, read on in this thread. 1/n

The study was born out of a combination of my research on cooperation among militant actors and @wyss_m’s interest in proxy wars. A former @IDCHerzliya thesis student of mine, Michel is now at the Swiss Armed Forces’ Military Academy at @ETH_en. 2/n

He has also started a PhD at @UniLeidenNews under the supervision of @IDuyvesteyn + @andygaw]. Working with @wyss_m was by far the best and most rewarding part of this project. If you don’t follow him on Twitter, you should. 3/n

Our article examines an issue that has gained little attention to date: nonstate actors that sponsor proxies in their own right. Specifically, we ask why and how non-state sponsors (NSS) use proxies and discuss implications of this trend for international security. 4/n

Our study matters b/c many contemporary conflicts feature proxy relationships, and non-state actors play an increasingly prominent part in these. We also know from existing studies that networked organizations tend to last longer and are more dangerous. 5/n

Non-state sponsorship is an underresearched and undertheorized subject b/c existing scholarship analyzes sponsor-proxy relationships predominantly through state-centric lens, which views sponsors of proxies almost exclusively as state actors. 6/n

While we are not the 1st ones to point out that non-states can sponsor proxies, we believe ours to be the 1st in-depth discussion of this topic. We offer both empirical evidence for existence of non-state sponsors + a theory for why and how non-states sponsor proxies. 7/n

So why and how do non-states sponsor proxies? We argue they do so mainly 4 perceived political value proxies offer--unlike state sponsors, who view proxies mostly as mil assets. In short: states use proxies as military surrogates, non-states use them as political ancillaries. 8/n

Why do non-state sponsors use proxies as political assets? Because they are typically constrained by capacity gaps as well as governance and legitimacy deficits. Proxies help NSS address these shortcomings. The implication is that NSS typically seek.. 9/n

.. and utilize proxies that possess comparative pol advantages that sponsor lacks. Most imp'ly, NSS seek proxies in an effort to shore up their own legitimacy, help them govern, and engage with local populations that are suspicious of the sponsor’s intentions. 10/n

We test our theory using three cases—AQAP’s reliance on Bedouin tribes in Yemen; the YPG’s use of proxies in the framework of the SDF; and Hizballah’s sponsorship of the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (Saraya). 11/n

The Hizballah case is of special significance. The gp enjoys high degree of governance capacity + legitimacy, and is therefore the “least likely” case to fit our theory. But our case studies support our argument even in this "hard" case. 12/n

Our study suggests that for most non-state actors, reliance on proxies is more need- than interest based. This means that proxies of non-states possess greater leverage over their benefactors when compared with proxies of state sponsors. 13/n

We can also expect relations between NSS and their proxies to be less consistent + durable than sponsor-proxy relations involving state sponsors. Power b/w NSS and their proxies is more evenly distributed, and such relations are quite dynamic, pragmatic, and transactional. 14/n

If this trend continues, future armed conflicts will become even more complex. While this is not good news, there’s an upside. Non-state sponsorship presents great risks to sponsors, who are susceptible to pressures + manipulations induced by their proxies + outside parties. 15/n

I’d like to thank a # of ppl and institutions who supported this project. 1st of all @KarenGreenberg3 who provided me with an academic home during my 2-yr stint in NY. Thanks 2 @CarnegieCorp which funded a proxy conflict project @CNSFordhamLaw that supported this research. 16/n

During the writing of this research, I also benefited from my students @Columbia and @idc_herzliya, and from discussions I had with my colleagues at @CTCWP and @IDCLauderSchool. We are also grateful for helpful comments from colleagues at @apsanet and @isanet. 17/n

Tks 2 many scholars whose work informed and inspired our thinking about proxy relations. Partial list, no partic. order: @dbyman + @lawfareblog, @apmumford, Geraint Hughes, @IdeanSalehyan, @ariel_ahram, @eborghard, Tyrone L. Groh, @naomiprof; @Dr_JMRickli and @andreas_krieg 18/n

@drmabon + @projectSEPAD; @brian_jphillips @mortenvalbjorn; @VladimirRauta + gr8 team @Journal_IS incl Sean Lynn-Jones; @MorganLKaplan; Diane McCree + of course 3 fantastic external reviewers. 19/n

For more see https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/political-power-proxies-why-nonstate-actors-use-local-surrogates. Thanks for reading and good health to you all. The End. 20/20