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Monday was the 10 year anniversary of Mourinho and Pep's first Champions League knockout tie showdown - 20/04/10: Inter 3-1 Barcelona. Here is a tactical analysis thread of the game...

First some quality video analysis:

Formations & Team Selections

•Pep's team selection was peculiar as he's repeated in other UCL games since
-Bedrock of Barca success as reigning Champions of Europe & run to the semis this season was based on a 4-3-3 - Henry-Messi (false 9)-Eto'o then Pedro/Iniesta-Ibra-Messi

-But Pep selected what can only be described as an asymmetric 4-3-1-2
oMidfield 3 of Xavi,Busq+Keita (Iniesta injured)
oMessi given a free role behind a front 2 of Ibra+Pedro who stayed wider on the right
oNo natural left winger (with Messi or Keita often filling the space)

•Mourinho's selection was also interesting
-Inter+Barca had already played each other in the UCL group stages that season
- Mourinho had opted to be defensively solid with a diamond midfield in both games,but it left them very blunt in attack- Inter didn't score (0-0 & 2-0 loss)

•Mou learnt from this error & changed system for this game to a 4-2-3-1, which he had sometimes used instead of the diamond
- composition of the midfield 3 was key - alongside Sneijder who had 9 G/A in 11 UCL starts that season, he played 2 pure ball-winners in Motta & Cambiasso

•Another fascinating sub-plot which many often forget is that Mourinho made a selection that Pep first actually used the previous season
-Eto'o (having swapped in a deal with Ibra plus moeny between the two clubs the previous summer - another sub-plot) was used on the right wing

- Pep had often used Eto'o on the right wing so he could then play Messi thru the middle as a false 9- for example, in the 2009 Champions League final vs Man Utd when Eto'o was very effective - including cutting inside & scoring from this position

Key Tactical Themes

•At the start,Inter's right flank of Eto'o+Maicon struggled defensively - Maxwell occupied one with constant runs down the left,the other often had no player to track but needed to react to Messi drifting from his 10 position or Keita combining down the left

-this is how Barca made it 1-0 - Keita makes a run into the left half-space,drawing Maicon in narrow
-Eto'o has not responded to this & is still trying to press from the front- leaving Cambiasso with a tough task to get across from the double pivot
-Maxwell then assists the goal

• But as the game progressed Inter dealt with Barca's left-hand side dynamic much better & we saw the cons of Pep not playing a natural left winger
- Eto'o dropped deeper on the right to help Maicon deal with the dual threat of Keita/Messi's runs on the left & Maxwell's overlaps

- In an almost identical scenario to the Barca goal, you even see Eto'o pointing to Maicon to cover Keita's run inside whilst he runs across to track Maxwell's overlap

•Having two ball-winners in the double pivot with Motta-Cambiasso was vital
-defensively it nullified Messi's free role- denied him space in between the lines
-Messi was also shut down when he dropped deeper to dribble thru the middle- attempted 10 dribbles! And only completed 4

-but aggressive ball-winning & winning 2nd balls in the middle,also enabled Inter to counter quickly while Barca's defensive shape was distorted-either when they committed men forwards (especially full-backs)- 2nd goal.Or when Barca had just won the ball back themselves- 3rd goal

•After recovering the ball,there were more elements to Inter's counters.Key was to evade Barca's high press after just losing the ball- Domènec Torrent (Pep's assistant): "When we lose the ball,we must press high in 5 seconds.If we don’t regain it in 5 seconds then foul & reset"

-Although Pep's high pressing when Barca lost the ball was a strength,it's intriguing to see Mourinho also viewed it as Barca's greatest weakness

Post-game Mou said: "The moment to hurt them was in attacking transition when we recover the ball"

There were many elements to this:

1. Powerful dribbling in transition to evade press
•First Pandev whose starting position when Inter won the ball was often deeper to track the marauding Alves who racked up 15 assists that season

•Pandev only played 55 mins yet still completed the 2nd most dribbles in the match - one of his dribbles led to the 2nd Inter goal as it took 3 Barca pressers out of the game and he went on to slide in Milito who assisted Maicon

2.Passing thru the press
•On 55 mins,Mou subbed Pandev off for Stanković, reverting to a 442 diamond
-Stanković wasn't just a ball-winner in Cambiasso & Motta's mould-more technical ability & he took responsibility to play thru Barca's press,with his passing instead of dribbling

• The other key in transition was the dynamic between Milito & Eto'o
-while one dropped central to connect midfield to attack
-the other made a run into wide channels to exploit the spaces behind the advanced Alves & Maxwell
-Eto'o had pace but Milito was also deceptively quick

•The speed of both Milito & Eto'o also enabled them to both penetrate Barcelona's high line

•It's interesting to contrast Ibra's performance with Milito
-the static nature of Ibra's performance was very clear
-whilst Milito often dropped deep to connect midfield to attack or made runs into wide channels, Ibra did neither & rarely interchanged positions with Pedro/Messi

- There was a period of play which encapsulates this:

Phase 1) A big gap appears between Zanetti (LB) & Samuel (left CB)- Ibra doesn't make run into the space

Phase 2) 11 seconds later,the gap is between Samuel & Lúcio in a similar space- Samuel is struggling. No run from Ibra

Phase 3) Another 11 seconds later, the large gap between Zanetti & Samuel re-appears- still no run from Ibra

5 mins later,Pep's patience ran out and Ibra was hooked after 61 minutes- he suffered the ignominy of Abidal coming on at LB & natural LB Maxwell moving to the left wing

- Static nature of Ibra's performance becomes very clear when comparing his touch-map with Milito
o Milito has many touches in wide areas where he made intelligent runs
o Ibra's are exclusively grouped in central zones (except for two wide right) plus ZERO touches in the box

•This lack of movement & positional rotation with the other attackers forced Barca to change their natural tiki-taka game as they sought to find Ibra in the air
-Barca made 29 crosses - just 4 were accurate. They made 23.6 crosses per game in the knockout stages that season

-in 2010/11 when Barca regained the UCL after selling Ibra & playing a mobile front 3 of Villa-Messi (false 9)-Pedro, they made 15.6 crosses per UCL KO game
-in 2008/09,it's no coincidence that Barca also won the UCL with a more mobile front 3 of Henry-Messi (false 9 again)-Eto'o

•The final key in attacking transition was Mourinho's emphasis having late runners exploding from their compact block into positions where they could flood the box, after Milito & Eto'o had done the work we described above

1.Maicon who's run into the box for the 2nd goal was tracked by nobody-picked out by Milito who had made the wide run we talked about
-phenomenal acceleration so he could spring so quickly from defence
-exacerbated by Barca having nobody in a permanent wide left role to track him

2. Sneijder
- wasn't at his playmaking best on-the-ball - 0 chances created from his passing
- but his intelligence to find space off-the-ball was crucial
o 1st goal - he saw Pandev drag Alves inside & filled the resulting space in the box to score

o 3rd goal - this time Alves is caught upfield & Sneijder makes the run behind him to the far post to get on the end of Etoo's cross and assists Milito

END OF THREAD

This thread took weeks of research, analysis and writing

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