This is a thread about the centralization or decentralization of the state in Afghanistan. By writing on this topic I am inviting virtually all Afghans and analysts of Afghanistan to attack me. Bring it on.

There are sincere and well-intentioned proponents of both positions in this debate, but the general pattern is that each side claims that their proposed model would provide good governance and that the opposing model serves ethnic, tribal, or factional (warlord) interest.

It reminds me of a Jewish joke. A rabbi meets a couple who have a dispute. The husband explains the wrongs the wife has done. The rabbi listens and says, "you're right." The wife says, "Wait rabbi!" and she lays out her story. The rabbi shakes his head and says, "You're right."

The rabbi's student (his talib) who has been taking notes, says, "Rabbi, first you say the husband is right! Then you say the wife is right! They can't both be right!" The rabbi thinks and says, "You're right too."

The opponents of the current system say that it is so over-centralized that there is no accountability for the provision of services, decision making is slow and cumbersome, and the system is used by a small Kabul-based elite to protect its interests. They're right!

The opponents of decentralization say that the government is so weak at the provincial and district levels, and hardly exists in the villages, so a decentralized administration would be captured by the armed local elites that have formed in the 40 years of war. They're right!

Some advocates of decentralization charge that centralization is an instrument of ethnic or tribal (Pashtun) domination, or the tool of a corrupt Kabul elite. Advocates of centralization say that corrupt factional leaders manipulate ethnic politics for personal and factional gain

I can't say that these arguments are all wrong. Each model can produce a different form of corruption or tribal-ethnic conflict. It is hard to distinguish the sincere advocates of good government from those campaigning for their rightful share of corruption.

My conclusion: the issue is not so much centralization or decentralization per se: it is accountability and the rule of law. The criticisms of the current system are largely justified: but decentralization of corruption is not good governance.

If power is devolved to provinces, districts, or villages, what mechanisms will t prevent local power holders from capturing the new institutions? How will local finances be managed? How will the govt guarantee that local control does not degenerate into warring militias?

Talk about centralization and decentralization in the abstract is a form of sloganeering that lends itself to ethnic, tribal, and sectarian manipulation. A serious debate will have to propose concrete mechanisms.

Finally, in the context of a peace process with Taliban, no territorial solution will settle the matter. The Taliban's demand for an "Islamic system" is not about territory. It is about the power of the ulama, legitimated by their claim to authority in interpreting God's word.

This has nothing to do with centralization or decentralization. Measures to resolve the conflict over these issues within the Islamic Republican coalition will not address the demands of the Taliban. The problem of how to combine Islam and constitutionalism is another topic.