A #thread of some observations in reporting about this sea change in China-HK constitutional order ahead of LegCo election.

1) The Q "whether LO is bound by BL22" is slightly beside the point at this stage as LO argues that it's bound by BL but it's NOT INTERFERING as it is... https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1253174135703793664

...exercising a "supervisory power conferred by China's constitution and the Basic Law".

2) You can't find the articles conferring this "supervisory power". So the center of gravity for now and future is this unchartered power for LO to "supervise" HK....

3) What can it supervise? Beijing laid out 4 areas: Central-SAR relationship, enforcement of OCTS and BL, operation of political system, and major social interests. The first exercise as we have seen is targeting @cpdenniskwok and pro-dem lawmakers for "legislative paralysis"...

4) Most of the current pro-dem lawmakers will seek re-election in September but if they were found misconduct or betraying oath, they are highly likely to be DQ-ed, before or after the election. Not hard to understand this as pro-dem is fixing muscle for majority...

5) Now, would HK government be able to say no when LO, in the coming months, say it has to "supervise" the LegCo election? Can LO be legally challenged with ultimate backing of NPCSC's power to interpret Basic Law?

6) The arrest of pro-dem 15 is a key step to fulfill the official line of "HK opposition inviting foreign interference into HK and being the black hand behind HK's social unrest and political predicament", which, justifies "supervision from central authorities".

7) Given LegCo election in September and US presidential election in November, a rather critical race and gaming of major powers in which Hong Kong is likely to be a centre of grinding may come in the last quarter of 2020.