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THREAD: 1. It's right to worry that Israel may soon unilaterally annex large chunks of the WB, a huge mistake that could kill chances for 2 states. But there are many factors that go into whether that will actually happen or not. I wrote about them here: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-trump-biden-or-his-base-on-annexation-netanyahu-must-decide-who-s-dispensable-1.8790864
2. The coalition agreement lets Bibi bring annexation to a vote starting July 1. He only needs to consult w/Gantz and be in agreement w/Trump. Gantz chose a unity government to address the COVID emergency &avoid a 4th election, sacrificing much leverage in coalition negotiations.
3. Netanyahu is keen to capitalize on the promise of Trump's "peace plan", which envisions Israel annexing some 30 percent of the WB, a tantalizing legacy for him. But what factors will go into that decision? First, Israeli politics, which suggest that annexation will happen.
4. Gantz, tempered his praise for Trump’s plan with caveats calling for steps to be taken in agreement with the Pals & supported by international consensus. But knowing that a Knesset majority supports annexation, Gantz seems unlikely to throw himself in front of the train.
5. Second, regional relations, which may cut both ways. A major objection from Jordan, endangering its peace treaty w/Israel, or from Arab states like Saudi Arabia, could inject new caution into the Israeli debate or timetable.
6. But those states, consumed with COVID-19 challenges & an oil market collapse, &still solicitous of Trump, might not go beyond mild rhetorical opposition. Pal Auth threats to suspend security and health cooperation with Israel are likely to be dismissed, perhaps dangerously so.
7. Third, US politics: the logic of proceeding with annexation before the US election is more complex. For diehards, ain't no time like the present: the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity of the Trump plan must not be squandered. Annexation is urgent precisely because he could lose.
8. For others, rushing forward only months before the US election is a foolhardy step. If Trump wins, nothing would hold back annexation in his second term. But if Joe Biden is elected, Israel could find itself in an awkward position with the new administration.
9. In his video address to the AIPAC policy conference, Biden called on Israel to end its threats of annexation, saying they undermine support for Israel among younger Americans in both parties, and urged Israelis and Palestinians both to do more to preserve prospects for a 2SS.
10. Israel may be counting on Trump to immediately recognize Israeli sovereignty over those areas it annexes, which no other country will join. But should Israel expect a Dem Admin that seeks to restore US leadership and shore up traditional alliances to uphold that recognition?
11. Should Israel expect an admin that sees preserving a viable 2SS as crucial to US interests - indeed, as critical to the long-term health of a values-based US-Israel partnership that enjoys bipartisan support, to refrain from any balancing step that provides some hope to Pals?
12. If Israeli strategists, not just pols, gain a seat at the table, these questions could give pause on annexation. Underscoring the point, over 130 mainstream US Jewish leaders, many with ties to Biden, just urged Israel not to proceed with annexation. https://jewishinsider.com/2020/04/u-s-jewish-leaders-urge-gantz-to-block-netanyahus-annexation-plan/
13. A fourth factor is the technical and political challenges in preparing and implementing annexation. It is actually a much more difficult matter to implement than it looks at first blush.
14. In February, the US &Israel appointed members of a joint mapping committee charged with determining the precise boundaries of the areas that Israel would annex &the U.S. would recognize. It convened at least once in the WB, before the world was turned upside down by COVID-19.
15. Now, travel constraints &social distancing, the committee's work is challenged like all group projects. During Israel's health &econ emergency, it may be harder to justify the resources in staff &time, or the health risks to the participants, to rush forward with the project.
16. Meanwhile, the committee has had little or no input from Israel’s security sector, esp the IDF, which would have to defending the serpentine redrawn borders. Ex-Chief of Staff Gantz might insist on adding committee members who bring that perspective. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/23/netanyahus-annexation-plan-is-a-threat-to-israels-national-security/
17. But the work of this committee was always likely to be extremely difficult. Netanyahu’s confident predictions before the election that it could complete the mapping in a few weeks were wildly optimistic.
18. That's because once the work gets underway, there will be heavy lobbying from settler communities, supported by influential politicians, to define their borders in expansive terms, which in aggregate could far exceed the 30 pct of the West Bank stipulated in the Trump plan.
19. Relevant history: Following a 2004 exchange of letters between Pres GW Bush & PM Ariel Sharon and their top aides, the two governments agreed to embark on a process of defining the areas of Israeli settlements in which the US would not object to continued construction.
20. Then-US Amb Dan Kurtzer, who led the US side of the negotiations, wrote about what happened next. His Israeli counterpart, BG Baruch Spiegel, committed to bring maps outlining the settlement boundaries Israel sought to agree upon. But he never did. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2010/03/01/behind-the-settlements/
21. Faced with settlement leaders advocating broad definitions of their territory, Spiegel was unable to establish an internal Israeli consensus on what the boundaries should be. The talks with the Americans quietly petered out, and no understandings on boundaries were reached.
22. That exercise involved only Israeli settlements in "the blocs" near the 1967 lines, when total settlement population was 247,000. Trump envisions annexation of over 120 settlements throughout the WB, including deep in a Pal state, with a total population well over 400,000.
23. Anyone who says it's easy to gain Israeli consensus, much less a US-Israeli agreement, over those boundaries (or whether to accept Trump's call for a Pal state in the remainder) in a few weeks of committee work ignores the history &reality of what influences those decisions.
24. Can Netanyahu, heading into his trial on corruption charges, resist the pressure of his political base for broader annexation? Would Trump, who thinks he gave Israel a great deal, accept more annexation than his plan envisions? Or an annexation that rejected Pal statehood?
25. How would Arab states react as the boundaries stretched? And if the jockeying for favored border outcomes, or objections from Arab states, prolongs the mapping process into the fall, how would the decision look to Israelis only weeks before a possible Biden victory?
26. If you are a betting person, don’t confuse excitable rhetoric with cold reality – and don’t mortgage your future on any outcome. End
