New article in @lawfareblog with @S_R_Anders - "When Can the President Withdraw From the #OpenSkies Treaty?" brief summary thread below (1/9): https://twitter.com/lawfareblog/status/1253035710602448897

(2/9) the future of U.S. participation in #OpenSkies is unclear. The administration wants out of the treaty, much like it #INF a year ago. So keen to leave, there isn't a normal interagency process being used to reach a decision. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/05/trump-administration-treaty-war-russia-withdraw

(3/9) in part, the Trump Admin is acting on Russia's noncompliance with the treaty. but the advocacy to get out of Open skies is based on fundamental opposition to the purpose of the agreement (+ arms control generally): reciprocal military transparency https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1243

(4/9) proponents of #OpenSkies note the benefits of the agreement, to U.S. allies and U.S. relationship with those allies - foundations of American security - far outweigh the risks. See this article by former State colleagues @atomicbell and @antwier https://www.justsecurity.org/66664/abandoning-open-skies-trump-would-be-squandering-more-of-our-security-inheritance/

(5/9) There's been plenty of debate over this "will they, won't they" story, including debate in Congress, where democrats and some republicans support staying in and implementing the agreement.

https://www.fischer.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/9/fischer-fortenberry-bacon-applaud-open-skies-funding-in-fy2019-defense-funding-bill

(6/9) but what can congress really do to stop the admin from exiting #OpenSkies? Legal challenges to exec. branch treaty withdrawals don't have a track record of success. See https://www.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-856

(7/9) a more explicit assertion of congress' interest and responsibility in managing US participation in treaties (something that's sorely missing). As we say:

(8/9) Finally, Congress can rely on more traditional methods of shaping arms control policy. e.g, the Appropriations Power:

(9/9) at a time when arms control policy is more ebb than flow, Congress can demonstrate its independent interest in securing arms control that benefits U.S. security, rather than depending on executive branch processes where arms control politics may matter more than substance.