On Saturday, the #GNA launched a military offensive to capture #Tarhuna.

What we forecasted in our last report has so far proven accurate.

Given that details about the operation have been mired in confusion, this thread will attempt to outline some key points.

{THREAD} https://twitter.com/libyadesk/status/1251184924717170689

1. To capture #Tarhuna, the #GNA had prepared the following:

A ground offensive from Garabouli
A ground offensive from Msilata
Air raids
Cutting electricity, fuel & basic commodities
Flipping #BaniWalid

To do so, the #GNA hoped to capitalise on its recent successes.

2. The #GNA successfully launched its offensive through Garabouli. However, the landscape there favours #Tarhuna due to the twists & turns of the hillside roads.

Meanwhile, the #GNA failed to get sleeper cells in Msilata to simultaneously launch an offensive of their own.

3. This is due to the fact that the last time the #GNA persuaded a group in Msilata to attack Tarhuna, it resulted in an outright defeat. As such, groups in Msilata did not participate in the attack, fearing that a failed offensive would result in dire repercussions for them.

4. In addition, the #LNA knew that the only way a #GNA offensive on Tarhuna could succeed was if routes from Msilata were utilised. Thus, it carried out warning airstrikes on Saturday morning to ensure that did not happen.

5. Although the #GNA has been steadily developing its air superiority in recent weeks, its performance on Saturday was lacklustre at most as it did not manage to deliver decisive blows. This could be due to lack of solid intelligence.

6. Cutting electricity, fuel & basic supplies from reach #Tarhuna in an attempt to fuel popular unrest backfired against the #GNA as it only served to strengthen the somewhat complex relationship between the #LNA & Kaneeyat.

7. The #GNA's attempt to flip #BaniWalid and get the town to block essential supplies from reaching #LNA forces via its airport also failed.

The #LNA amounted enough social pressure to counter #Misrata’s efforts to flip Bani Walid.

8. Furthermore, scenes of post- #GNA victory in Surman & Sobratha has made flipping towns a much more difficult task for the GNA.

The #GNA had hoped to capture #Tarhuna or at least mount a strong enough offensive so that Kaneeyat withdrew from #Tripoli. Neither took place.

9. The #GNA offensive was a powerful one but, as long as it relies solely on the Garabuli road, success will be difficult.

For such an operation to succeed, recent history has shown that sleeper cells are essential.

However, the GNA won’t find that kind of support in #Tarhuna.

10. The #GNA had a solid opportunity to deliver a powerful blow to the #LNA on Saturday. If not by outright taking #Tarhuna, at least by getting Kaneeyat forces to withdraw from southern #Tripoli. However, it rushed its operation, hoping to build on recent territorial gains.

11. We has been informed that the #GNA was so confident in its operation that some officials had prematurely informed international actors about their victory.

As mentioned in last week’s report, this was the GNA’s best opportunity to destabilise the #LNA in western #Libya.

12. After suffering a setback, the #GNA heads back to the drawing board. This gives the #LNA more time to prepare for a counteroffensive — after receiving external support to regain its air superiority.