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You know what, I& #39;m a historian of the Vietnam War. Let& #39;s talk chaplains and soldiers attempting to report atrocities in Vietnam. (thread)
1/a whole bunch
1/a whole bunch
Christian Appy used the example of Sven Erikkson (a pseudonym) to illustrate the challenges facing soldiers reporting war crimes. 2/
Erikkson refused to join the rape and murder of a young Vietnamese woman, but reported the crime once he returned to base despite the threats of the sergeant commanding the patrol. 3/
Erikkson initially reported the rapes and murders he witnessed through a captain, presumably his company commander, who promised to investigate the incident. 4/
That didn& #39;t happen, so Erikkson turned to a chaplain, who contacted the U.S. Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and the case eventually resulted in courts-martial for those involved. 5/
Soldiers who witnessed atrocities faced the questions of who to report them to, what the consequences for their actions would be, and whether anyone would believe them. 6/
Like My Lai, this case shows the issues facing soldiers moved to report war crimes. It took determination to persevere long enough to prod the Army to investigate and prosecute soldiers who committed potential war crimes in Vietnam. 7/
Hugh Thompson, the helicopter pilot who intervened to stop the massacre at My Lai, provides another example of a soldier who relied on chaplains to move his war crimes allegations forward. 8/
Thompson felt moved to place his career on the line by intervening in an ongoing massacre, and then reporting the murders to both his commanding officers and the brigade chaplain. 9/
The battalion’s chaplain, Capt. Carl Cresswell. Exhibiting the same faith Thompson held in the Army’s hierarchy, promised reported Thompson’s allegations of war crimes to his own superiors.10/
Cresswell contacted the Division chaplain, Lt. Col. Lewis, about war crimes at My Lai. Like Thompson, and threatened to leave the Army if “there was not going to be an investigation into these charges I was going to resign my commission.” 11/
At that point, Creswell let the matter drop, believing a proper investigation was underway because he “had a tremendous faith in the Army at that point. In that particular instance, that faith was not justified. Certain people decided not to deal with it.” 12/
Cresswell reported the atrocities at multiple levels in the Americal Division, taking his concerns both to the 11th Brigade and Americal Division chaplains to initiate an investigation. 13/
Although the Peers Commission criticized Creswell for not ensuring that a proper investigation occurred, he spoke to the other chaplains several times before they told him that they had turned the reports over to the respective Chiefs of Staff. 14/
The Army let Cresswell, a career officer who tried to do the right thing, down leading him to resign his commission after the end of his tour of duty because he came to believe that the Army did not think it was possible for a GI to murder a Vietnamese civilian. 15/
An incident near LZ English shows how access to a chaplain could encourage soldiers to report war crimes they witnessed even when they feared the consequences. 16/
Specialist James Rodarte of Temple Terrace, Florida initially refused to give CID a statement after his PSG ordered him to take part in the murders of three dusk farmers near the LZ. 17/
Rodarte even lied to Charles Davis, the senior Catholic chaplain for the 173rd Airborne Brigade, about the incident during their initial conversation because he feared PSG Bumgarner and was confined in the same Conex container with him. 18/
Fr. Davis& #39; meetings with Rodarte, Sergeant Thomas Dvorak, and Specialist Charles Boss show how critical the confluence of fear, group solidarity, and religious belief was in determining if soldiers reported atrocities, or cooperated with investigations. 19/
The first two elements seem to reduce soldiers’ willingness to report American war crimes, but in this case, the combination of religious belief and group solidarity seemed to encourage these soldiers to at least reluctantly cooperate with the CID investigation. 20/
Davis told Rodarte that it did not seem like he was telling the whole truth about the incident, and said that any time he wanted to change his story he would be happy to discuss it with him. 21/
Two days later Rodarte told the priest that he was sorry about lying during their earlier conversation, but explained that he did it because he was very afraid of what might happen - much of their discussion focused on Rodarte& #39;s confusion and fear. 22/
Instead of the moral detachment or vacuity that Joanna Bourke contends afflicted most soldiers who passively avoided atrocities (Rodarte shot over the villagers& #39; heads), Rodarte’s reaction displays significant internal conflict between conflicting imperatives. 23/
Rodarte was afraid of physical danger from Bumgarner during the shooting, but was also confused about what to do because his superior gave him orders that were clearly illegal and immoral. 24/
He believed that he was required to obey the orders even though he didn& #39;t want to, so he took the intermediate step of shooting the ground near the prisoners, which allowed him to appear to follow orders while not murdering anyone. 25/
Fr. Davis & military authorities recognized the importance of fear & religious belief as influences on soldiers’ reactions to atrocities. Both topics became the subject of repeated and lengthy debate during the Art 32 hearings & courts-martial for both Rodarte & Bumgarner. 26/
In a deposition for Rodarte’s court-martial, Dabis explained that Rodarte’s confusion related to illegal and immoral orders, stemming from Basic Training’s emphasis on the requirement to obey all orders issued by superiors, and the potential consequences of failure to do so. 27/
Davis had served in a Basic Training Unit and had provided training on immoral orders to boots and used examples to show how that training worked. 28/
Davis testified that "if a man wants to go to church on Sunday and the sergeant says no you may not go, you may not go period and the man is authorized to go to church... 29/
... The man is supposed to obey the order and then later on bring it to the attention of the superior in command. The same thing is understood among these men." /30
The question for Rodarte and other soldiers faced with war crimes was how they were supposed to deal with those types of illegal orders in the moment. Davis believed that other soldiers in the 173rd Airborne Brigade had the same confusion as Rodarte. 31/
When exactly were they supposed to know when their superiors had lost their legal and moral authority to command when giving illegal or immoral orders? 32/
Davis’ interactions with Rodarte, Boss, and Dvorak illustrate a range of emotional & religious responses to the murders of the three Vietnamese farmers. 32/
At a minimum, their discussions with the Catholic priest significantly altered the men’s responses to CID agents. Before meeting with Chaplain Davis, all three declined to make official statements. 33/
Only after Boss asked to speak to Fr. Davis on February 25, and the chaplain spoke to Rodarte, did they slowly open up about the events of the afternoon. Davis’ visit had the most dramatic effect on Rodarte, who finally provided investigators a formal statement. 34/
During their first meeting, the story he told Davis was one that Bumgarner had concocted in case there was a problem – they had taken fire and shot at the victims, who were running. After talking to the priest a second time, Rodarte gave the investigators a different story. 35/
Capt. Norman Cooper, defense counsel for Bumgarner, understood the importance of religious belief and the potential effect of a religious authority figure on soldiers’ behavior and testimony. 36/
He accused Fr. Davis of manipulating both Rodarte and Dvorak, who witnessed the murders from his vantage on the ridge, into cooperating with the CID investigation by using his religious authority. 37/
Davis testified that Dvorak needed help in developing a “correct conscience” because he was struggling with the complexity of the situation and trying to determine the right thing to do. 38/
The stakes were not always quite so high. When LTC Wade Hampton, commanding officer of the 1/501 Infantry received a Bronze Star, some of his troops claimed that he had shot either wounded or dead enemy troops to gain it. 39/
In addition to SP4 Gerald Leventry and LT Theodore Coughlin, Hampton& #39;s RTO, identified only as Christie, tried to either protest Hampton’s mutilation of the dead VC through the chain of command, or to resist the award nomination process for his medal. 40/
Christie, who accompanied Hampton to retrieve wounded VC, informed CID agents that he did not know why the battalion CO had shot the two dead men. 41/
Combined with the medals the Army awarded him and Hampton, the incident made him uncomfortable because it seemed like a normal operation, lacking in heroism or danger beyond the norm – the unarmed, seriously wounded prisoner posed no threat to him or Hampton. 42/
Christie believed that shooting dead Viet Cong was a violation of the Geneva Convention. He did not report it, though, because he was warned not to by officers at the battalion or brigade level, who implied that if he “made a fuss” he would find himself back out in the field. 43/
Despite that warning, Christie discussed the incident with the battalion chaplain, Reverend Pitchford. The spiritual adviser told the perplexed TRO that it would only create problems for both of them if he reported the incident. 44/
Although Christie believed that Pitchford would not aid him primarily because he wanted to protect his own position, the chaplain notified the battalion executive officer about the incident and discussed it with the Brigade chaplain. 45/
Assured that Acting Brigade commanding officer Col. Wes Loeffert was aware of the circumstances surrounding the prisoner’s capture, Pitchford believed that he had fulfilled his moral and professional obligations to report it. 46/
Combined with warnings from other officers on the battalion staff not to broach the subject with Hampton due to their past differences of opinion, led Pitchford to advise Christie that any formal charges would have to come from him. 47/
When other soldiers indicated they would not support him if there was an investigation, the only protest he could muster was refusing to sign a statement for the award nominations for his and Hampton’s Bronze Star Medals. 48/
Other chaplains actively discouraged soldiers from reporting war crimes. When Dennis Stout asked a chaplain for guidance about reporting the murders of noncombatants, he was told to stay quiet. 49/
Stout later said that "I just wanted to stay alive long enough to someday tell people what happened. My moral cop-out was to live through it, because I couldn’t stop it at the time." He reported the murders to CID after his discharge. /50
The question of chaplains& #39; role in the military remains a complex one, especially when in combat. In Vietnam, they played an important role in both encouraging soldiers to report atrocities or in urging them to remain silent depending on their understanding of their role. 51/fin
