A thread on #Bhāviveka and #atheism: Bhāviveka is a Buddhist author who lived before or after #Kumārila (see Krasser 2012)
We will see that some of the arguments on atheism by Bhāviveka and Kumārila are very similar. 1/n

In his Mādhyamikahṛdayakārikās “Strophes on the heart of the middle path”, one finds argument against deities (devatā):
Having observed the flawed behaviour of the authors of the Veda, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva, |
it is correct to abandon that Veda! || 9.59 || 2/n

(trayīmārgapraṇetṛṇāṃ brahmakeśvaśūlinām |
dṛṣṭvā kleśātmikāṃ caryāṃ yuktaṃ yat tyajyate trayī ||)
You probably remember my division among the concepts of "god" in Sanskrit sources. Which concept of God is that attacking? Surely devatās. 3/n http://elisafreschi.com/2017/03/31/god-and-realism/

Further verses, dealing with the nature of god:
“Someone who has knowledge […] does not commit sin, because there is no reason for it.” (MHK 9.61, Eickel 2019)
“Someone who has knowledge […] does not commit sin, because there is no reason for it.” (MHK 9.61, Eickel 2019) 4/n

“If the Lord kills brahmins, drinks alcohol, has desire and still sees the truth, why don’t those who follow the same path see the truth”? (MHK 9.65, Eickel 2019) 5/n

“If the Lord kills brahmins, drinks alcohol, has desire and still sees the truth, why don’t those who follow the same path see the truth”? (MHK 9.65, Eickel 2019) Again, the attack is only at the devatā-level. Why should it work, given that it refers to Vedic-like devatās? 6/n

How can this be a valid atheist argument?
Because of the religious continuity typical of Sanskrit sources (which has many times emphasised by discussants in this TL).
Possible answers from the perspective of the bhagavat-approach? (Hint: a bhavgavat-like God is beyond ethics). 7/

Possible answers from the perspective of the bhagavat-approach?
1. One should not behave like God, but like their devotees: explicitly said (bhāktavat, na tu kṛṣṇavat…)
2. God is not like us: at least implicitly present 8/n

N.B. At first, Bhāviveka does not attack the existence of (a) god(s), it just explains that they could not have created the world. So, they might exist, but are irrelevant. As in #Buddhism. 9/n

However, Bhāviveka also wrote a commentary on #Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamikakārikā ‘strophes on the middle way’, the key-work of Madhyamaka Buddhism. Look at how original his commentary is in the next tweets. 10/n

Nāgārjuna:
na svato ’pi nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ |
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana || MMK 1.1 ||
“There is nothing that has ever arisen anywhere from itself, from something else, from both of from no cause” (see Eckel 2019) 11/n

Bhāviveka takes this chance to discuss the existence of a Lord (NB the relation text-commentary!)
In his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s MMK, Bhāviveka uses the epic lament of Draupadī to say that the Lord is arbitrary (and therefore cruel): 12/n

First, let me evoke the lament of #Draupadī from MBh
“You were upright, gentle bountiful, modest, and truthful—how could the spirit of gambling swoop down on you? My mind has become utterly bewildered and burns with grief as I see this sorrow of yours and this great distress.13/n

On this they quote the old story, how people are in the power of the Lord and have none of their own.” (Mahābhārata, transl. Van Buitenen)
14/n

Bhāviveka's comment:

The world is not created by the Lord, because it is the cause of pleasure for some [and of pain for others] |
just like a Lord who creates pleasure is not created by the Lord || 15/n

(kasyacit prītihetutvāl loko neśvarakartṛkaḥ|
vidadhāno yathā prītiṃ neśa īśvarakartṛkaḥ || 3.215 ||)
Do you understand the point at stake? The verse look weird! It surely presupposes an inference: 16/n

General structure of an #anumāna:
Inference:
(probans): e.g., smoke
(locus): e.g., mountain
(probandum): e.g., fire
NB: the probans and the probandum must co-exist in the locus
an example is needed (to avoid empty sets) 17/n

In the case at stake:
(probans): i.e., being an arbitrary cause of pleasure?
(locus): i.e., world?
(probandum): i.e., being created by the Lord?
(example): i.e., just like the Lord Himself is not created by the Lord 18/n

That is, the Lord=the maximally just. The world cannot be created by the max. just, because the world is unjust (so, there would be a logical contradiction), just like the Lord’s body is not created by the Lord (as this would also lead to a logical contradiction) 19/n

1. The Lord=the maximally just.
2. The world cannot be created by the max. just, because the world is unjust (so, there would be a logical contradiction),
3. just like the Lord’s body is not created by the Lord
(as this would also lead to a logical contradiction 20/n

—since the Lord should be the creator of all, but if He did not create His body, He is not the creator of all, and if He did create His body, how could He?) 21/n

Summing up, why is there no God?
1. Because of cruelty (see above), which is contradictory
2. Because god is just one among the many things to be known (i.e., they are part of the world, not outside it)
3. Because karman fulfils the same role
22/n

The second argument is commonly used in #Sanskritphilosophy: it can be known—»therefore it exists (but in this way, one does not get out of the realm of knowable entities, which is what should be accounted for)
Les us look at it in more details: 23/n

it can be known—»therefore it exists
For instance: The Lord is knowable, therefore He exists, like a pot
But, then, He should share also further qualities with the pot!
As for 3.: Through karman one can avoid the charge of partiality and cruelty…but is this really a progress?24/

“If karman is the Lord, that causes the diversity of the world consisting of sentient beings and their environment, this proves something that we already accept” (MHK 3.222, Eckel 2019, 41)
That is (as in Kumārila): you are just calling "god" what I am calling karman!
25/n

Bhāviveka mentions another atheist argument, insofar as he criticises a standart theist argument, the potter’s argument. This is akin to the clockmaker’s argument (e.g., in #DavidHume’s Dialogues concerning natural religion). 26/n

The world is a product, hence there must be a producer, like a pot.
Main reply by Bhāviveka: It does not lead to the establishment of the Lord as the opponent imagines them. 27/n

“If you specify that [the Lord] is eternal, one, and subtle, there is no example. And your [Lord] suffers the fault of being impermanent, having a form (body) and being born” (MHK 3.221, Eckel 2019)
28/n

What could God create?
—Not the self/selves (because they are assumed to be unproduced, ajanyatvāt)
—Not dharma ‘righteousness’ and adharma (because they are their qualities)
—Not the body (because it is produced by dharma in order to experience acc. to karman) 29/n

(Cf. MMK 9.96, Eickel 2019)
Further arguments:
Why is the Lord God?
—Because of karman—»then the karman is the real cause
—Because of no cause at all—»then he would not be God 30/n

The Lord cannot be the cause of the world, because they are subtle, whereas the world is corporeal (same argument as in Kumārila)
—»general principle: like principles, like results 31/n

Grand finale explaining that theism must be wrong based on this-worldly results: “Why are some Buddhists happy while his [i.e., Śiva’s etc.] devotees suffer?” (MHK 9.112—3) 32/32

(the whole thread is due to @krishnadeltoso's question)