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In Malaysian Public Law, I write about the unusual 1-day parliamentary sitting fixed on 18 May.
What is the motive & effect behind this move?
What can we learn from the UK Supreme Court's decision on Boris Johnson's prorogation controversy?
https://malaysianpubliclaw.com/1-day-parliament-sitting-motive-machinations-lessons-from-uks-prorogation-controversy/
What is the motive & effect behind this move?
What can we learn from the UK Supreme Court's decision on Boris Johnson's prorogation controversy?
https://malaysianpubliclaw.com/1-day-parliament-sitting-motive-machinations-lessons-from-uks-prorogation-controversy/
So far, the following facts are clear:
(1) Muhyiddin’s Gov is a newly formed one which has not yet been tested in Parliament
(2) Muhyiddin needs to convene Parliament at least by 19th June 2020, otherwise he is in violation of Article 55(1)
(1) Muhyiddin’s Gov is a newly formed one which has not yet been tested in Parliament
(2) Muhyiddin needs to convene Parliament at least by 19th June 2020, otherwise he is in violation of Article 55(1)
(3) Muhyiddin however faces the risk of:
(a) a motion of no confidence by the Opp; or
(b) demonstrating he doesn’t have confidence of the House if any Supply Bill or important motions (such as the motion of thanks after the Royal Address) are not passed by the majority of MPs
(a) a motion of no confidence by the Opp; or
(b) demonstrating he doesn’t have confidence of the House if any Supply Bill or important motions (such as the motion of thanks after the Royal Address) are not passed by the majority of MPs
(4) From a reading of the 17th April 2020 letter, the 1-day sitting:
(a) prevents any motion of no confidence to be tabled; and
(b) will not involve any voting on Government Motion/Bills, and therefore no showcase of whether Muhyiddin commands confidence of the House (cont)
(a) prevents any motion of no confidence to be tabled; and
(b) will not involve any voting on Government Motion/Bills, and therefore no showcase of whether Muhyiddin commands confidence of the House (cont)
Why 4(b)?
Past precedent: after a royal address by YDPA, sitting will be adjourned to next day (similar to last 2 sessions i.e. 11th Mar 2019 and 17th Jul 2018). Even if not, there will be a debate on the YDPA’s speech for about 2 weeks and there will be no voting in between
Past precedent: after a royal address by YDPA, sitting will be adjourned to next day (similar to last 2 sessions i.e. 11th Mar 2019 and 17th Jul 2018). Even if not, there will be a debate on the YDPA’s speech for about 2 weeks and there will be no voting in between
(5) No reasonably early date has been fixed for the next meeting of Parliament
Given the above facts, it would be reasonable to deduce that Muhyiddin is convening Parliament merely to comply (barely) with the technical requirements of Article 55(1), and is attempting to prevent his Government from facing a confidence vote.
UK Supreme Court held:
A decision to prorogue Parliament will be unlawful if has the effect of frustrating/preventing, without reasonable justification, ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions to supervise Executive.
A decision to prorogue Parliament will be unlawful if has the effect of frustrating/preventing, without reasonable justification, ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions to supervise Executive.
If the 5 facts remain, arguable that Muhyiddin’s 1-day parliamentary sitting has effect of frustrating/preventing, w/o reasonable justification, Dewan Rakyat’s ability to carry out constitutional function to supervise Executive & test whether this Gov commands confidence of House
