The report repeats concerns about Iran's Nuclear Archive:

"Iran’s efforts to retain files, documents, and personnel related to its pre-2004 nuclear weapons program – as revealed in the atomic archive acquired by Israel in 2018 – suggest that Iran may have maintained..." 2/
"...this information at least in part to preserve technical expertise relevant to a nuclear weapons capability, and potentially to aid in any future effort to pursue nuclear weapons again, if a decision were made to do so." 3/
It discusses the IAEA's finding of refined uranium, noting:

"Iran’s intentional failure to declare nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards would constitute a clear violation of Iran’s CSA required by the NPT, & would constitute a violation of Art. III of the NPT itself." 4/
Report notes Iran's failure to permit IAEA access:

"...at two locations not declared by Iran, & did not substantively respond to [IAEA] requests for clarification regarding possible undeclared nuclear material or activities at those locations & a third, unspecified location. 5/
It notes with concern Iran's expansion of uranium enrichment:

"Iran progressively expanded its uranium enrichment activities and stockpile of enriched uranium, key factors in determining the amount of time required to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon..." 6/
"...or device, should Iran decide to pursue nuclear weapons.

If Iran were to manufacture or otherwise acquire a nuclear weapon, such actions would violate its obligations under Article II of the NPT." 7/
Iran's Chemical Weapons Convention compliance:

The report re-asserts the 2019 finding that "the United States has concerns that Iran is pursuing pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) for offensive purposes." 8/
Moving on - North Korea:

"[North Korea] was in violation of its obligations under Articles II & III of the NPT & its CSA with the IAEA at the time it announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, and it remains accountable for these violations." 9/
Syria:

Syria "remains in violation of its obligations under Article III of the NPT and its CSA with the IAEA. Syria failed to declare and provide design information to the IAEA for the construction of a nuclear reactor at Al Kibar..." 10/
"Given the IAEA’s finding of particles of chemically processed uranium compounds at the site, the United States remains concerned regarding whether any undeclared nuclear material might exist in Syria." 11/
Russia:

The U.S. "assesses that Russia has conducted nuclear weapons-related experiments that have created nuclear yield. The United States does not know how many, if any, supercritical or self-sustaining nuclear experiments Russia conducted in 2019." 12/
..."Russia may be testing in a manner that releases nuclear energy from an explosive canister, which raises compliance concerns with Russia’s TTBT notification obligation." 13/
China, as reported today by the Wall Street Journal:

"China maintained a high level of activity at its Lop Nur nuclear weapons test site throughout 2019. China’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur test site year-round, its use of explosive containment chambers..." 14/
"...extensive excavation activities at Lop Nur, and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities – which has included frequently blocking the flow of data from its International Monitoring System (IMS) stations..." 15/
"...to the International Data Center operated by the Preparatory Commission for the [CTBTO] – raise concerns regarding its adherence to the “zero yield” standard adhered to by the US, UK, and France in their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria." 16/
China's missile proliferation:

China "has failed to adhere to its Nov. 2000 commitment to the United States not to assist 'in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons...'" 17/
"(i.e., missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a distance of at least 300 kilometers).”

This failure to adhere to its Nov. 2000 commitment is reflected in Chinese entities’ continued supply of items to missile programs of proliferation concern." 18/
Burma made the report again this year:

"The available evidence does not support a conclusion that Myanmar (Burma) violated the NPT; however, the [US] remains concerned about Burma’s lack of transparency regarding past nuclear work..." 19/
"...as much of this knowledge remains within the military and is not reported to the civilian government.

Burma’s implementation of the AP and a modified SQP will improve confidence regarding an assessment of Burma’s NPT compliance." 20/
Those are the items that caught my interest, feel free to add on any others of importance to this thread! 21/
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