There are multiple problems with this argument, but I want to focus on the problems beyond the short-term problems they would engender in Iran by pursuing this strategy
What is often omitted in these discussions is that by using democracy promotion tools, NGO support, sanctions, humanitarian aid, and more as covert regime change tools, it only harms these tools of foreign policy as they become seen as regime change trojan horses
Indeed, we hav already seen countries throw out the NED, IRI, target civil society groups that get vague american funding out of fears they will try to overthrow the regime.
Additionally, it encourages a view of the U.S. as single-minded focused on regime change, so when we try to engage on different issues, regimes worried about American regime change view everything through that lens.
It then encourages the regime to act more aggressively both domestically and internationally to preserve itself, harming domestic activists and democracy builders, many of whom have no links with US, and harms American interests in region.
In other words, regime change advocates often overlook the long shadow that regime change can have on future tools of American statecraft and perceptions of American behavior.
In other words, the US should resist using soft tools such as sanctions, democracy promotion, USAID programs etc to help foster regime change as it only cheapens these tools more broadly.
There are other problems in here on the specifics of Iranian policy, but the claim that we can do regime change without military so yay no more Iraqs is just as problematic if not more so.
As my own research shows, once you start down path of regime change, even if you don’t intend lengthy occupation mission, you often get sucked into one. Thus only commit to regime change if you really think a 10 year + occupation mission is worth it
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