I find that there is something very inspiring about the pluralist liberal vision.

Each individual has their own conception of the good; their own preferences, projects, and plans; their own interests and aptitudes. 1/ https://twitter.com/lastpositivist/status/1249252019476496385

They have their own person, and their own property, which they are master of. A piece of the world over which they are sovereign.

In and with this piece of the world they are free to instantiate their conception of the good, pursue their projects and plans. 2/

Likewise, they are free to voluntarily associate with others who share their conception of the good, and over what they are jointly sovereign permit and prohibit according to their shared private reasons. 3/

These individuals and associations are also free to voluntarily exchange with others, where there is a coincidence of interests - mutually benefiting both parties to the exchange. 4/

And out of the world of these sovereign individuals with their voluntary activity, orders emerge - often far better than anything humans could consciously design or impose on others.

One consequent being: private gain and loss get roughly aligned with social benefit. 5/

Before I get into OP's post, already there are some problems with this vision from the outset.

How would it be achieved? It seems to valorise non-interference, but the protection of person, title, and contract would require such interference. 6/

And it seems to rely on an implicitly at least roughly egalitarian distribution of property - or at minimum everyone having at least some - the achievement and maintenance of which would require further interference beyond mere protection of title. 7/

Moreover, the extent to which someone can really be "sovereign" - even if just over their own person, property, and agreements - would likely rely on guaranteed provisions of needs. 8/

Turning to OP's post, there appear to be two ways we can justify the pluralist liberal vision: as either a theory of right which is neutral towards the good, or as a perfectionist vision of society in its own right.

Let's look at each head in turn. 9/

On the former, the pluralist liberal would likely have to concede there are some assumptions about the good being made, but could argue that these are very thin, and that their doctrine allows for the most substantive degree of neutrality compared to its rivals. 10/

Is this true?

A socialist likely wouldn't think so.

Fundamental to the pluralist liberal vision is a sphere of the external world which individuals can own - ie private property. 11/

A society which chooses to recognise private property means that anyone who tries to step onto, take, or use something without who society recognises as the owner's consent can be legitimately subject to brutalisation to prevent them from or punish them for doing so. 12/

For someone whose conception of the good doesn't include the existence of private property, this is certainly someone else's substantive conception of the good being forcibly imposed on them.

Hardly very "neutral". 13/

Even someone who supports the existence of private property, but just doesn't recognise the prevailing distribution, is in the exact same manner also going to have someone else's substantive conception of the good forcibly imposed on them! 14/

There are two responses a pluralist liberal who justifies their position by appeal to neutrality can make.

One, they could distinguish between the right and the good, and argue that their position is neutral towards the latter but not in respect of the former. 15/

But people disagree on the right just as they disagree on the good - and people even disagree on the legitimacy of this distinction - and so even if this defence could work, it would still be to concede that their position lacks a substantive degree of neutrality. 16/

Two, they could accept that private property is non-neutral, but argue the existence of private property is necessary to maximise the amount of neutrality achieved.

Neutrality between individuals' conceptions of the good requires a sphere where they are independent from 17/

others and their conceptions. This requires ownership over one's own person, and a space in the external world which is theirs too, outside of the grip of any collective they haven't chosen. 18/

Moreover, socialists - or social democrats, theocrats, fascists, you name it - would still be free to live out their vision.

They would just have to find others who share their vision, voluntarily associate with them to create their preferred society between themselves. 19/

The converse would not be possible. With none of your own property, you would have no space in which to build - and materials by which to build - a community according to your own conception of the good.

I find this defence of pluralist liberalism plausible. 20/

Turning to perfectionist defences of pluralist liberalism, this seems far trickier.

If autonomy is what we value, why should it be the individual's from interference, rather than the individual's ability to exercise autonomy in society, or collective notions of autonomy? 21/

And why should autonomy be our highest political goal (or even a goal at all)? All of us are at least partially dependent all of the time and completely dependent some of the time - and some of us are completely dependent all of the time. 22/

Why not construct a society which recognises such a fact and develops care and solidarity around it instead?

Or why not a society which seeks to instantiate a certain distributive principle: say, from each according to their ability, to each according to their need? 23/

And given we're in the realm of promoting a particular conception of the good, it will have to be argued over and above religious visions, nationalist visions, popularly prevailing visions, and so forth. 24/

How such debates over the good could even be settled - in theory, let alone in a way which would win widespread public assent - is an open question.

Philosophers haven't succeeded over millennia! 25/

In sum:

I find pluralist liberalism to be an inspiring vision.

How it could be realised is hard to envision. It looks as though the best we can do is find the right balance between non-interference and certain interferences to best approximate it. /26

Whilst pluralist liberalism is far from truly neutral, there is a strong likelihood it is the most substantively neutral political vision.

Perfectionist defences of pluralist liberalism look harder to rigourously make, but as above there is something inspiring about it /27

- maybe such a defence would be grounded in what is inspiring about it.

Allahu 'alam. 28/28