This course of action, that paid field staff are unnecessary beyond providing the bare necessities, is one of the biggest internal failures. I have deep respect for the many volunteers I met. But Bernie’s theory of change, that if we expand the

electorate by engaging disaffected or excluded people we can develop a winning coalition, calls for long term deep organizing. To get these demographics out to vote, months long, full-time organizing by trained and effective staff is necessary. Look at the states we won.

IA, NH, and NV all had field organizers on the ground for months. In almost every other state our campaign relied on volunteers, assisted by a reduced team of remote organizers, to act as if they were paid staff. “Bernie Victory Captains” were expected to put incredible

amounts of time and energy into recruiting other volunteers, launching canvasses, and more. God bless those who did this but it is not an effective field model. It doesn’t allow for the long term and sustained organizing Bernie’s path to victory required.

For example, we had 8 staff in Michigan. A state we needed to win. The 8 of us there arrived with 6 or so weeks to the primary. Once there we found a massive network of very enthusiastic volunteers, many committed to doing all they could.

But due to the lack of on the ground staff able to provide this expansive volunteer network with the resources necessary to engage all of these volunteers most effectively, our efforts were disjointed. Many volunteers knew this. It was palpable. Of course, we then lost Michigan.