I think we really need to distinguish between failures of the liberal order, which are clearly on display, and failures of liberal democracy, which are much less so
at the global level the US has consciously stepped away from a leadership role. So of course you get echoes of Kindleberger and the interwar period, “Britain couldn’t and the US wouldn’t” etc https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/aftershocks-the-coronavirus-pandemic-and-the-new-world-disorder/">https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/a...
but look China’s efforts haven’t gone to plan either, and are already causing all kind of backlash. You don’t build hegemonic appeal with defective masks and conspiracy theories. Workers of the world unite this ain& #39;t
Russia meanwhile has mostly stayed out of it, trying to take care of problems at home. It’s facing some huge infrastructure and governance issues. https://twitter.com/ProfPaulPoast/status/1247852604547371008">https://twitter.com/ProfPaulP...
so at the great power level, the order is loosening. But failure of American leadership is not the same as failure of democracy. At the domestic level, probably the best performers so far are Asian democracies https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/coronavirus-and-future-democracy-europe">https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/co...
a case could be made for Germany, New Zealand, maybe some others. It’s really too early to tell. But which nondemocratic regime springs to mind? Singapore maybe, always a weird case https://fortune.com/2020/02/28/singapore-coronavirus-contained-response/">https://fortune.com/2020/02/2...
so, unlike other global shocks of the 20th century - the world wars, the great depression, the soviet collapse - there are no clear great power winners, no visibly discredited regime types. Not yet anyway. /sorry, this thread went on longer than intended
http://assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/i11034.pdf">https://assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/...
http://assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/i11034.pdf">https://assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/...