Vietnam War thread.

Why do I study pacification in a single province during Vietnam War? That's a question many of asked me since 2011. That year is when my dissertation advisor suggested I take a look at the war in Phu Yen.

That seemingly nondescript province remained unspecified despite years of attention by Saigon & Washington. Fortunately for me the University of Southern Mississippi had the papers of an U.S. advisor who had spent time in Phu Yen. His papers revealed a province rife with trouble.

I should note now that I'm doing thread sans whiskey.

Back to Phu Yen. During the Ngo Dinh Diem years, the Strategic Hamlet program made Phu Yen look like a province on the up and up. Its rich rice producing lands existed largely under Saigon's control.

All of that dramatically changed after the U.S. backed coup against Ngo Dinh Diem. After his death, the political infrastructure largely crumbled. By 1964, South Vietnamese government's control in Phu Yen existed solely in the province capital––Tuy Hoa City––and adjacent areas.

At the same time, the armed wing of the National Liberation Front, the People's Liberation Armed Forces, commenced a campaign to cement communist control in Phu Yen. The PLAF received substantial material support from Hanoi.

Also in 1964, elements of the 95th People's Army of Vietnam arrived. With the arrival of PAVN and its relatively well armed soldiers, the Strategic Hamlets fell one by one. PAVN also hemmed South Vietnamese forces into Tuy Hoa City.

With PAVN seriously jeopardizing Saigon's control of the city, the future looked bleak for Saigon's presence in Phu Yen. By 1965, Phu Yen needed a major military response from Saigon.

What happened in Phu Yen had, or was, happening across the Republic of Vietnam. Additionally, in 1965 the U.S. went from advisor to fully fledge participant. That meant American troops were destined for Phu Yen.

By the end of 1965, U.S. and Korean maneuver battalions set up shop in Phu Yen. Shortly thereafter, in 1966, the Allies began a series of intense operations to push back PAVN and PLAF units. Control of rice production was front and center.

Efforts to protect the rice harvest lasted into the 1970s. From 1966 to 1969, the U.S. Army conducted operation after operation to safe guard the rice producing Tuy Hoa Valley. Efforts to bring PAVN to battle largely failed.

Despite losing direct access to rice, the 95th PAVN Regiment retained enough combat power to create havoc in the 1968 Tet Offensive. Moreover, the 95th provided sufficient cover and aid to the PLAF as to keep Allied pacification efforts largely in check.

So why Phu Yen? Why did I say yes, this is what I want to study? With the aforementioned tweets in mind, the symbiotic relationship between conventional forces and pacification fascinated me––and Phu Yen served well as a setting.

Years of Allied efforts to advance pacification at the barrel of a gun only produced momentary gains. When the U.S. Army ceased activity in Phu Yen at the end of 1969, they left a province unprepared to defend itself. Communist forces retained enough power to menace Saigon.

From 1970 to 1972, the PLAF firmly re-established roots into most villages. When the last U.S. Province Senior Advisor left Phu Yen, he commented that no one knew how much territory Saigon really controlled in the province. In effect, Phu Yen looked much like it had in 1964.

Fin.

If you enjoyed this thread, extra reading is available here: http://drrobthompson.com/articles/