Amazing feature of the Sabre case (shout out to @jlazarev for noticing). The court finds in para 102-4 that Farelogix *tried* to become 2-sided and was blocked (excluded) by Sabre, thereby causing the two companies to legally not compete any more, thereby allowing a merger!

This creates an interesting strategy for 2-sided platforms. If it can use interoperability/other tactics to eliminate 1 side of a rival's business, antitrust cases against the platform become much harder because a court can find they are not merging w, or excluding, a competitor.

1/ More thoughts on Sabre: The court finds that Farelogix developed a great product and sold it to airlines. It then wanted to be 2-sided and connect to travel agents. The court in para 102-4 finds that Sabre (and the other GDSs together!) excluded Farelogix and confined it to

2/ staying 1-sided, though growing. Furthermore, the court is clearly uncomfortable in saying the merger is ok purely due to SCOTUS saying that 2-sided platforms don’t compete w 1-sided (fn 16). With all of that material, why not align reality with the law by explaining that

3/ Farelogix is a potential horizontal competitor in 2-sided platforms, having shown they are successful on one side and want to enter the other? That their nascent entry was blocked by Sabre further demonstrates the two would compete and that, if no merger, a larger stronger

4/ Farelogix is likely to try entering again. Describing the greater game as 2-sided squares with AmEx, while incorporating potential/nascent competition is consistent with Microsoft. I am not an attorney - someone tell me why a court couldn't argue like this?