The fall of Island No. 10 on April 8, 1862, was a severe blow to Confederate fortunes on the Mississippi River. Although remembered as a largely bloodless affair, the joint Army-Navy offensive on the river assured Federal control of the Mississippi all the way to Memphis, TN.

Aside from its strategic importance, the Confederacy could ill-afford the loss of more than 4,500 men taken prisoner, and materiel losses that included 5,000 stand of arms, 109 cannon and mortars, and large amounts of ammunition and provisions.

Coming so soon on the heels of the defeat at Shiloh, the loss of this strategic river bastion was a deep blow to Confederate morale and boded ill for hopes of renewed offensive efforts that might retrieve the initiative for CS forces in the West.

The precariousness of Island No. 10’s position had been obvious to CS authorities from the start. Only about a mile long and 1/4 mile wide, it lay at a reverse S-shaped bend in the river, and was surrounded by swamps. It was largely safe from a landward approach.

Despite this seeming safety, the fort needed the river for its communications and resupply; a vulnerable, single-track road to the small town of Tiptonville, TN was its other main lifeline.

The fort itself was impressively built and mounted heavy batteries in its outer works that ranged the river channel for over ten miles north. A total of 19 guns defended the fort with another 43 emplaced on the bluffs at New Madrid, MO.

An enterprising CS naval officer, Cdr. Geo. N. Hollins, erected a massive floating battery which had been towed upriver from New Orleans.

It was obvious to US planners that New Madrid was key to the fort. An expedition mounted by Brig. Gen. John Pope marched a force of 15,000 men over 50 miles and besieged New Madrid in early March 1862.

The operation lasted two weeks, with Pope’s heavy siege guns proving too much for the CS defenders under Gen. John McCown.

New Madrid secured, the main object remained. A Navy riverine force under Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote departed from Cairo, IL, and brought the fort under fire on March 15, 1862. Foote’s initial efforts against the fort were disappointing.

Foote’s mortars failed to accrue any advantage for US forces and the inefficacy of long-range shelling against the fort would provide lasting lessons for the navy.

In a preview of one of Grant’s abortive attempts at canal-building in the Vicksburg Campaign, Pope’s men would attempt to dig a passage for Foote’s ships. This having failed, the navy would try running past the fort’s guns by night.

Using foul weather for cover, the USS Carondelet successfully passed the fort on April 4, 1862 without damage. Two days later, the USS Pittsburg would make the passage, providing Pope with a powerful gun platform and enabled his men to cut the road with Tiptonville.

On April 7, 1862, impressed with the gravity of the impending US army-navy attack on the now-isolated fort, Capt. W. Y. C. Hume, Island No. 10’s commander, sought terms from Foote. Foote demanded unconditional surrender and Hume acceded.

Pope was unable to prevent the escape of over 1,000 CS soldiers on the Tennessee side of the river, who fled to safety through the swamps.

This victory, combined with his performance at Corinth, would elevate John Pope as a Union hero and earn him command in Virginia.