Read on Twitter
THREAD, some thoughts on details in the @opcw report on the Assad's regime use of Sarin gas in Match 2017 in the town of Ltamenah in Hama province:
First, the persistent involvement of the Syrian scientific research center & unit 450 is notable https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2020/04/opcw-releases-first-report-investigation-and-identification-team
First, the persistent involvement of the Syrian scientific research center & unit 450 is notable https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2020/04/opcw-releases-first-report-investigation-and-identification-team
The SSRC and its subordinate unit 450 have long been associated with the production, weaponization, distribution & miniaturization (more on that later) of Assad's CW stockpile (which Putin promised Obama that Assad would totally get rid of in 2013). 450 was behind the 2013 Ghouta
Sarin attack that killed over a thousand civilians in the Damascus suburbs. What's interesting here is it seems that Unit 450 (regime has subsequently re-labeled the unit) officers were involved in the 2017 Ltamenah Sarin gas attack. Similar patterns as 2013 Ghouta attack
Officers would check weather, 450 personnel would move heavy equipment in place in prepersrion for the attack. The signature for an impending Sarin gas attack hadn't changed much since 2013. The Trump admin would finally strike SSRC office in Barzeh in Damascus by 2018. And...
For the first time destroy a Sarin precursor storage facility (Him Shinshar military installation). Again, not until 2018. The US strikes in 2017 hit the Shayrat airbase that OPCW cites as the originating base where Assad's planes launched the CW strike in Ltamenah. The SSRC
Had a facility nearby Shayrat. earliest public reporting on SSRC, unit 450 command structure was by @adamentous from 2013 who outed a 450 mil commander by name of Bassm Hassan who reported directly to Assad. I wonder if Bassam Hassan is one of redacted names in the OPCW report
By 2015 the regime was producing binary CW precursors again, with SSRC leading effort. @adamentous excellent reporting on this indicated Obama admin opposed targeting unit 450 & SSRC even after it was evident that Obama's 2013 deal w Putin on Assad's CW stockpile failed miserably
The SSRC was also behind the miniaturization program for various Sarin gas delivery vehicles. The use of modified IRAMs for the Ghouta 2013 attack was extension of SSRC effort to quickly recalibrate how to best use & deliver binary CW agents in an unconventional manner.
SSRC was also behind the innovation of the use of barrel bombs. Which by 2012 were in wide use by regime. The OPCW report shows that Unit 450 & SSRC CW command & control still very much active. Which means Brigadier General Bassam Hassan is still active in CW attacks...
The order would've been given directly from Bashar al Assad for the Ltamenah attack to begin. As the OPCW report indicates, SSRC has liaison officer direct to Pres office. Unit 450 (or whatever the units new designation is) is under direct op command of office of Bashar al Assad
Syrian war crimes prosecutors in Europe have great deal of physical evidence in form of documentation detailing orders from conventional military units & Intel agencies, but little to nothing from within the SSRC & subordinate units like 450. OPCW report puts the war crimes
Spotlight back on the SSRC & unit 450 command elements.
General Bassam is the most prominent member of a triumvirate within SSRC that oversee CW & solid fuel missile precision strike capability enhancements). A member of the unholy trinity Aziz Esber was neutralized in Aug 2018
General Bassam is the most prominent member of a triumvirate within SSRC that oversee CW & solid fuel missile precision strike capability enhancements). A member of the unholy trinity Aziz Esber was neutralized in Aug 2018
This is a pic of Bassam al Hassan given to @JenGriffinFNC by one of her sources. The OPCW report whole not naming him, should reignite an effort to dig deeper into SSRC complicity in war crimes & a full accounting of Unit 450 officers direct involvement in CW attacks post 2013
Looking back at @adamentous reporting on unit 450 from 2013, one reason given by Obama admin officials for hesitancy to not strike unit 450 sites is that they were afraid of the CW falling into wrong hands....
It would take five long years and many more binary CW attacks until a US president would finally show resolve & requisite leadership to directly strike SSRC & unit 450 facilities in Shayrat airbase, CW storage & production in west Homs, & cmd & cntl HQ in Damascus.
Those military strikes for now are the only justice served for the victims and survivors of Assad's chemical campaigns. But the perpetrators are still at large & emboldened w impunity offered to them by Russian mil in Syria. END THREAD a
Addendum: at time of 2017 CW strike, @mod_russia military commanders & liaison officers were intimately involved in Assad military campaign to recapture cities in N. Hama on the M5 highway. Given amount of prep work & presence of 450 officers prior to attack as OPCW report shows
Given all this, hard to believe @mod_russia didn't have advance knowledge of the 2017 Ltamenah CW attack or certainly at least of the Khan Sheikhun attack (another strategic city on M5 highway Assad was seeking to capture) that almost immediately took place after Ltamenah p
Perhaps that's why @mod_russia fervently targeted hospitals treating victims of the Khan Sheikhun attack in 2017. Signals that strongly suggest Russian forces were monitoring in real time the staging process & eventual launch of CW in North West Syria https://apnews.com/19772be1238e49fbb62c509a5b659b3d/Official:-Russia-knew-Syrian-chemical-attack-was-coming
