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Some thoughts about why finding joint political solutions to deal with health & economic crisis at EU level has proven so very difficult.
Based on insights from my book on Euroscepticism & Future of European Integration @OUPPolitics that seem so relevant today
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Based on insights from my book on Euroscepticism & Future of European Integration @OUPPolitics that seem so relevant today
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EU is facing turbulent times, plagued by deep political divisions over how to shape its future.
A key reason for this is legacy of Eurozone crisis on public opinion: EU is politicized & has potential to shape electoral & political fate of leaders.
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A key reason for this is legacy of Eurozone crisis on public opinion: EU is politicized & has potential to shape electoral & political fate of leaders.
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Political fault lines are wide & crosscut continent from North to South on economic recovery & from West to East on democracy & human rights.
These are leftovers from previous crises, old wounds that never healed & left mark on public opinion as well.
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These are leftovers from previous crises, old wounds that never healed & left mark on public opinion as well.
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Bruised by previous crises, parts of public have come to doubt political & financial masters in Brussels.
Euroscepticism is not tied to small segments, extremist political parties or specific economic cycles.
It is engrained within domestic politics.
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Euroscepticism is not tied to small segments, extremist political parties or specific economic cycles.
It is engrained within domestic politics.
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Over half century of integration has created profound interconnectedness between political, economic & social fates of member states.
At the same time, however, fortunes of member states have started to diverge dramatically. Deep structural imbalances exist across Union.
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At the same time, however, fortunes of member states have started to diverge dramatically. Deep structural imbalances exist across Union.
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These imbalances are also reflected in public opinion.
Euroscepticism is not a stand-alone phenomenon. It is deeply rooted in & framed by people’s national experiences.
This means that Euroscepticism in North is not the same as in South or East.
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Euroscepticism is not a stand-alone phenomenon. It is deeply rooted in & framed by people’s national experiences.
This means that Euroscepticism in North is not the same as in South or East.
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Different realities make people want different things from EU, there is no such thing as Euroscepticism, only different types.
Now we see these different expectations & critiques about EU clashing.
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Now we see these different expectations & critiques about EU clashing.
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E.g. sceptics, especially within the North Western region, demand less intra-EU migration & lower monetary contributions.
While others, most notably in Southern and Central and Eastern European member states, wish to see more economic investment & employment programmes.
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While others, most notably in Southern and Central and Eastern European member states, wish to see more economic investment & employment programmes.
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This is not new, already evident since Eurozone crisis, see: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/euroscepticism-and-the-future-of-european-integration-9780198793380?cc=it&lang=en&
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Although it might be possible to strike a balance by introducing transfer/debt reduction mechanism that would allow poorer economies to grow & depress need for migration in future
fruits of such reforms would most likely only come to bear in the medium or long run.
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fruits of such reforms would most likely only come to bear in the medium or long run.
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Given the importance of EU matters in domestic elections and for the re-election of national governments,
current incumbents will most likely focus on their short-term political survival rather than medium- to long-term policy solutions.
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current incumbents will most likely focus on their short-term political survival rather than medium- to long-term policy solutions.
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This is what I coined domestic constraint.
This makes compromise at EU level so darn difficult to politically.
Yet, public opinion is NOT exogenous, it is malleable.
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This makes compromise at EU level so darn difficult to politically.
Yet, public opinion is NOT exogenous, it is malleable.
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If domestic political elites are committed to EU’s political & economic future, they need to move goalposts in domestic debates.
Why do we need compromise & why does it matter?
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Why do we need compromise & why does it matter?
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While US multilevel governance system arguably has also demonstrated costly dysfunction between its various levels,
EU is a much more fragile & limited set of institutions than the centuries old American nation-state.
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EU is a much more fragile & limited set of institutions than the centuries old American nation-state.
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EU cannot fall back on deeply rooted joint loyalty.
So Europe needs to get it right & fast.
This means facing hard truths about what European cooperation means for economy & future of democracy within EU borders.
It means shaping public opinion, not hiding behind it.
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So Europe needs to get it right & fast.
This means facing hard truths about what European cooperation means for economy & future of democracy within EU borders.
It means shaping public opinion, not hiding behind it.
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