Based on documents in the Iran Nuclear Archive, seized by Israel in early 2018, Iran's Amad Plan created the Shahid Mahallati Uranium Metals Workshop near Tehran to research and develop uranium metallurgy related to building nuclear weapons. 1/

Two images show this site as it looked in 2002 and 2003, when an existing workshop was renovated and brought into operation. 2/

The facility was intended as a pilot plant, aimed at developing and making uranium components for nuclear weapons, in particular components from weapon-grade uranium, the key nuclear explosive material in Iranian nuclear weapon cores. 3/

The site was meant to be temporary,until the production-scale Shahid Boroujerdi facility at Parchin was completed. However, the pilot plant was capable of making the first cores of weapon-grade uranium, in case Boroujerdi was unfinished when WGU would have had become available.4/

The pilot plant appears to have been largely finished and had become operational, ready to start work with uranium by the summer of 2003. 5/

The Amad Plan was downsized in late 2003 before this plant processed any weapon-grade uranium, although it did process a considerable amount of a non-uranium surrogate material into weapon components. 6/

The use of a surrogate material allowed Iran's nuclear weapons program to learn and practice the fabrication of key nuclear weapon components. 7/

The available information does not show that this facility had yet handled any uranium. However, the site was designed and built to process uranium into nuclear weapon components, under a plan to undermine Iran's obligation to subject all such material to safeguards ... 8/

... under its comprehensive safeguards agreement, with full knowledge that its actions would violate its commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to manufacture nuclear weapons. 9/

Analysis of commercial satellite imagery confirms the location of the Shahid Mahallati site based on comparison with exterior ground photos from the Archive, and a chronology of the site's status is included in our report. 10/

It is unknown when the pilot plant was closed or equipment evacuated; it may have continued operation or been on standby after 2003, potentially up to 2010. The key building of the site, the U metals workshop, appears gutted and abandoned between late 2010 and early 2011. 11/

This action may have been triggered by the Western discovery and exposure in late 2009 of the secret, deeply buried Fordow enrichment plant, formerly called the Al Ghadir project under the Amad Plan. 12/

As in many other cases, Iran has clearly been dishonest with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). During discussions in September 2015: 13/

"Iran informed the Agency that it had not conducted metallurgical work specifically designed for nuclear devices, and was not willing to discuss any similar activities that did not have such an application." 14/

The activities at Shahid Mahallati and Shahid Boroujerdi are a dramatic contrast to that statement, activities highlighting once again that Iran furthered its nuclear weapons capabilities far more than was known prior to Israel's seizure of the Nuclear Archive... 15/

... permitting Iran today to build nuclear weapons faster than previously believed. 16/

We do not believe that this site is one of the two sites the IAEA unsuccessfully requested to access during the last several months. 17/

Those Amad sites are known to have handled undeclared uranium, one reportedly conducted small-scale uranium conversion activities, the other tested key nuclear weapon components. 18/

Shahid Mahallati joins a long list of undeclared nuclear weapons related sites, locations, facilities, documentation, equipment, and materials from the Amad Plan, all requiring IAEA verification. 19/

The IAEA Board of Governors should urge Iran to cooperate fully in these investigations, despite their apparent age, as part of the IAEA's vital mission to ensure that Iran has not continued nuclear weapons work up to today. 20/

If Iran continues to defy the IAEA, the board should refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council for further action. 21/21 Read: https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/shahid-mahallati-temporary-plant-for-manufacturing-nuclear-weapon-cores